

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910409997503321
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Titolo	(Re-)Defining Racism : A Philosophical Analysis // by Alberto G. Urquidez
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Macmillan, , 2020
ISBN	3-030-27257-5
Edizione	[1st ed. 2020.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (xiii, 421 pages)
Collana	African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora
Disciplina	305.8001 305.8
Soggetti	Social sciences - Philosophy English language African Americans Social Philosophy English African American Culture
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di contenuto	Ch.1. Introduction: Summary of the Argument -- Ch.2. Introduction: Toward a Conventionalist Framework -- Ch. 3. Re-defining "Definition": An Argument for Conventionalism -- Ch. 4. Re-defining "Meaning": Defending Semantic Internalism Over Externalism -- Ch. 5. Re-defining "Disagreement": Rationality Without Final Solutions -- Ch. 6. Re-defining "Philosophical Analysis": Not Descriptive Analysis, Or Conservatism, But Pragmatic Revisionism -- Ch. 7. Adequacy Conditions for a Prescriptive Theory of Racism: Toward an Oppression-Centered Account -- Ch. 8. Racial Oppression and Grammatical Pluralism: A Critique of Jorge Garcia on Racist belief -- Ch. 9. Concluding Note.
Sommario/riassunto	What is racism? is a timely question that is hotly contested in the philosophy of race. Yet disagreement about racism's nature does not begin in philosophy, but in the sociopolitical domain. Alberto G. Urquidez argues that philosophers of race have failed to pay sufficient attention to the practical considerations that prompt the question

“What is racism?” Most theorists assume that “racism” signifies a language-independent phenomenon that needs to be “discovered” by the relevant science or “uncovered” by close scrutiny of everyday usage of this term. (Re-)Defining Racism challenges this metaphysical paradigm. Urquidez develops a Wittgenstein-inspired framework that illuminates the use of terms like “definition,” “meaning,” “explanation of meaning,” and “disagreement,” for the analysis of contested normative concepts. These elucidations reveal that providing a definition of “racism” amounts to recommending a form of moral representation—a rule for the correct use of “racism.” As definitional recommendations must be justified on pragmatic grounds, Urquidez takes as a starting point for justification the interests of racism's historical victims.
