

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910337810503321
Autore	Pepper Alexander
Titolo	Agency Theory and Executive Pay : The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma // by Alexander Pepper
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Palgrave Pivot, , 2019
ISBN	3-319-99969-9
Edizione	[1st ed. 2019.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (140 pages)
Disciplina	658.4072
Soggetti	Corporate governance Personnel management Organization Planning Behavioral sciences Corporate Governance Human Resource Management Behavioral Sciences
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di contenuto	1. Agency Costs, Coordination Problems and the Remuneration Committee's Dilemma -- 2. What's Wrong with Agency Theory? -- 3. What a Public Corporation Really Is -- 4. Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem -- 5. Behavioural Agency Theory -- 6. The Modern Corporation's Final Chapter.
Sommario/riassunto	This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioural science can help in the

design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

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