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Soggetti	Computer simulation Application software Computers and civilization Electronic commerce Computer science Numerical analysis Computer Modelling Computer and Information Systems Applications Computers and Society e-Commerce and e-Business Models of Computation Numerical Analysis
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Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Mechanisms -- On the Planner's Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design -- Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems -- Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games -- Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency -- The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games -- Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games -- The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds -- Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings -- Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing -- Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games -- Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games -- Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design -- Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities -- A New Derandomization of Auctions -- The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles -- Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To -- Doing Good with Spam Is Hard -- On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems -- On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games -- Swap Bribery -- Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games -- Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time -- Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes -- On Equilibria for ADM Minimization Games.

Sommario/riassunto

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009, held in Paphos, Cyprus, in October 2009. The 29 revised full papers presented together with 3 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 55 submissions. The papers are intended to cover all important areas such as solution concepts, game classes, computation of equilibria and market equilibria, algorithmic mechanism design, automated mechanism design, convergence and learning in games, complexity classes in game theory, algorithmic aspects of fixed-point theorems, mechanisms, incentives and coalitions, cost-sharing algorithms, computational problems in economics, finance, decision theory and pricing, computational social choice, auction algorithms, price of anarchy and its relatives, representations of games and their complexity, economic aspects of distributed computing and the internet, congestion, routing and network design and formation games and game-theoretic approaches to networking problems.

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