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	Titolo	Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate : Proving Their (In) Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
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	ISBN	3-319-74033-4
	Edizione	[1st ed. 2018.]
	Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (XV, 134 p.)
	Collana	SpringerBriefs in Economics, , 2191-5504
	Disciplina	324.6
	Soggetti	Welfare economics
		Elections
		Political science - Philosophy
		Economics
		Democracy
		Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy
		Electoral Politics
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		Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.
	Nota di contenuto	Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.
	Sommario/riassunto	This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures

thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.