

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910220152203321
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Titolo	Embracing the fog of war [[electronic resource] ] : assessment and metrics in counterinsurgency // Ben Connable
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Santa Monica, Calif., : RAND, 2012
ISBN	0-8330-6840-7
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (341 p.)
Disciplina	355.02/180973
Soggetti	Counterinsurgency - United States - Evaluation Counterinsurgency - Afghanistan - Evaluation Counterinsurgency - Vietnam - Evaluation
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	"Prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense."
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto	Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables and Text Boxes; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Background; Differences Between Campaign Assessment and Intelligence Analysis; The Role and Purpose of Military Campaign Assessment; Dissatisfaction with Counterinsurgency Campaign Assessment; Literature Review; Research Methodology; Issues Not Addressed; Organization of This Monograph; CHAPTER TWO: Concepts That Shape Counterinsurgency Assessment; Policy Requirements and Counterinsurgency Assessment; Wicked Problems and Counterinsurgency Complex Adaptive Systems, Nonlinearity, and Chaos Military Doctrine and the COIN Environment; Chapter Summary; CHAPTER THREE: Centralized Assessment Theory and Pattern and Trend Analysis; Centralized Quantitative Assessment; Differences Between Scientific Research and Campaign Assessment; Applying Scientific Rigor to Assessment; Time-Series Analysis; Time-Series Graphs in Military Assessment; Retroactively Adjusting Time-Series Analysis and Assessment; Pattern and Trend Analysis; Chapter Summary; CHAPTER FOUR: The Effects-Based Approach to Assessment What Is Effects-Based Operations Theory and How Does It Shape Assessment? Introduction to Effects-Based Operations; Elements of Effects-Based Theory: Definitions and System-of-Systems Analysis;

Effects-Based Assessment.; Measures and Indicators; Doctrinal Effects-Based Assessment Process: Overview; Selecting Measures and Indicators; Weighting the Assessment; Determining Thresholds for Indicators; Examples of Color-Coded Reports; Chapter Summary; CHAPTER FIVE: Choosing Core Metrics; Choosing "Metrics" and Determining Values; Considerations for Selecting Core Metrics Example of a Core Metric: First-to-Fire Indicator Example of Input Measures of Performance or Indicators; Example of Output Measures of Effectiveness or Indicators; Example of Measures of Effectiveness and Indicators from Doctrine; Chapter Summary; CHAPTER SIX: Vietnam-Era Assessment; Orientation to Vietnam, Circa 1967-1973; Overview of Vietnam-Era Assessment Processes; Thomas C. Thayer and the Southeast Asia Analysis Reports; Limitations of Thayer's Data; The Concept of "Reasonable" Accuracy; Body Counts; The Hamlet Evaluation System; Hamlet Evaluation System Concept and Execution Hamlet Evaluation System Data and Analysis Pattern and Trend Analysis of Vietnam War Data; Casualty Data and Impressionistic Assessment of the Vietnam War; Is Analysis of Vietnam Assessment Germane to Iraq and Afghanistan Assessment?; Chapter Summary; CHAPTER SEVEN: Assessment in Afghanistan; Overview of the Assessment Process in Afghanistan as of Late 2010; Data Management Challenges: The Case of Afghanistan; Problems with the Significant Activities Data Sets; Analysis of the Afghanistan Assessment Process; Chapter Summary CHAPTER EIGHT: Why Does Centralized Assessment Fail in Counterinsurgency?

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Sommario/riassunto

The unpredictable counterinsurgency environment challenges centralized, quantitative campaign assessment. A comprehensive examination of the centralized, quantitative approach to assessment, as described in the literature and doctrine and applied in two primary case studies (Vietnam and Afghanistan), reveals weaknesses and gaps and proposes an alternative process: contextual assessment.

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