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Warfare, 1916; Germany's Dilemma; Kaiser in a Corner
The Military Prevails-Germany LosesWhy Were the Risks Minimized?;
The Worst of All Options; CHAPTER SIX: Woodrow Wilson's Decision to
Enter World War I, 1917; Ending American Neutrality; Wilson Hesitates,
Maneuvers, Then Decides; Realism and Idealism; Reluctant but Right;
CHAPTER SEVEN: Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941; Hitler's
Momentous Mistake; Reversing Defeat and Gazing to the East; The
Decision for Operation Barbarossa; From Victory to Defeat;
Understanding Hitler and His Environment; A Flawed Theory of Success;
Conclusion; CHAPTER EIGHT: Japan's Attack on Pearl Harbor, 1941
Imperial Japan Colonizes ChinaU.S. Backlash; Fateful Decision; Moves
Toward War; Decisionmaking in Tokyo; Pyrrhic Victory; Japan's Flawed
Model of Success; Conclusion; CHAPTER NINE: U.S.-Soviet Showdown
over the Egyptian Third Army, 1973; The Makings of U.S.-Soviet
Confrontation; The Fate of the Third Army; Anatomy of Decision;
Success; Getting It Right; CHAPTER TEN: China's Punitive War Against
Vietnam, 1979; Mitigated Blunder; The Road to War; The Decision to
Punish Vietnam; Assessing the War; Deng as Decisionmaker; CHAPTER
ELEVEN: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979
The Beginning of the EndMonumental Mistake; Mission Creep, Soviet
Style; What Were They Thinking?; Failure to Imagine What Would
Happen; CHAPTER TWELVE: The Soviet Decision Not to Invade Poland,
1981; Counterrevolution in Poland; From a Reluctant Yes to a Maybe to
an Adamant No; Conversion on the Road to Warsaw; The Days and
Years to Follow; Were the Soviets Thinking Straight?; Lessons for
Strategic Decisionmaking; CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Argentina's Invasion of
the Falklands (Malvinas), 1982; As Bad as a Blunder Can Be; Argentine
Fury and Folly; In a Trap of Their Own Making; Unhinged from Reality
Rational but Wrong

Sommario/riassunto

The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon's invasion of Russia to America's invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars* analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
