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Titolo	Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate // by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
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Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (VIII, 88 p.)
Collana	SpringerBriefs in Economics, , 2191-5504
Disciplina	515.8
Soggetti	Economics Welfare economics Political science - Philosophy International Political Economy Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Political Philosophy
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters.
Nota di contenuto	Non-Monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Descriptions of the Voting Methods to be Analyzed -- Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Five Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- Eight Voting Rules Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failures Under Variable Electorates -- Practical Significance and Open Problems.
Sommario/riassunto	This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars

and students in the area of social choice.

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