1. Record Nr. UNINA9910163164303321 Autore Morton Professor Louis Titolo United States Army in WWII - the Pacific - Strategy and Command : [Illustrated Edition] San Francisco:,: Verdun Press,, 2014 Pubbl/distr/stampa ©2014 **ISBN** 9781782893974 1782893970 Edizione [1st ed.] Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (811 pages) United States Army in WWII Collana Soggetti Strategy World War, 1939-1945 Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese **Formato** Materiale a stampa Livello bibliografico Monografia Nota di contenuto Intro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- DEDICATION -- TABLES -- CHARTS --MAPS -- ILLUSTRATIONS -- FOREWORD -- THE AUTHOR -- PREFACE --

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Sommario/riassunto

This book, 'Strategy and Command: The First Two Years,' provides an in-depth analysis of the United States Army's strategic and operational conduct during the early years of World War II in the Pacific Theater. Authored by Louis Morton, it examines the development of military strategies and the complex international dynamics that shaped the conflict from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the Battle of Midway. The book covers key aspects such as the initial Japanese offensive, the strategic adjustments made by the Allies, and the challenges of coordinating joint military efforts. It is intended for historians, military

scholars, and readers interested in the strategic nuances of World War II.