Record Nr. UNINA9910158984403321 Autore Crane Conrad C. Titolo Cassandra in Oz : counterinsurgency and future war / / Conrad C. Crane Pubbl/distr/stampa Annapolis, Maryland:,: Naval Institute Press,, 2016 ©2016 **ISBN** 1-68247-020-2 Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (258 pages): illustrations Collana Transforming War Disciplina 355.02/18 Soggetti Counterinsurgency Military doctrine - United States Training manuals Technical manuals Iraq War, 2003-2011 Counterinsurgency - Iraq Counterinsurgency - Afghanistan Lingua di pubblicazione Inglese Materiale a stampa **Formato** Livello bibliografico Monografia Note generali Includes index. Nota di bibliografia Includes bibliographical references and index. New beginnings: engaging the puzzle palace -- Off to see the wizard: Nota di contenuto planning for Iraq -- Rearranging the bible : eggheads and jarheads --Inside the big tent: ringmaster to the stars -- From theory to doctrine: intellectual debates about contemporary warfare -- Behind the curtain: a reader's guide to FM 3-24 -- Malpractice or messiah? : launched into the storm -- Observing the payoff in Iraq: the view from Baghdad --Turning the switch on and off in Iraq: the view from the field --Beyond the doctrine: Basrah, Diyala, and Bucca -- Witches and wizards revealed: the coin wave recedes -- Final musings: observations on the long war. Sommario/riassunto This book describes how a team of Soldiers. Marines, and civilian academics created Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The manual's principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency, focus on legitimacy, and concepts of

operational campaign design have had immense influence on U.S. and NATO doctrine. Crane describes the hard work of Soldiers, Marines, and

civilians to achieve peace in places such as Baghdad, Anbar Province, and the detention facilities at Bucca. The book examines what went wrong in Iraq, as peace unraveled with the American departure, and also how the new counterinsurgency doctrine was never properly applied in Afghanistan. The final chapter covers the lessons that should be gleaned from the past.