

1. Record Nr.	UNINA9910157366003321
Autore	Benson Richard
Titolo	F in School [[electronic resource]] : Blunders, Backchat and Bad Excuses
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Chichester, : Summersdale Publishers Ltd, 2013
ISBN	1-78372-021-2 1-78372-019-0
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (128 p.)
Disciplina	371.00207
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di contenuto	Front Cover; Contents; Introduction; Classroom Chaos; Exam Time! Part 1; Saved by the Bell; Exam Time! Part 2; Terrible Teachers; Exam Time! Part 3; Sporting Behaviour; Exam Time! Part 4; If All Else Fails; Congratulations Graduates
Sommario/riassunto	Ahh, glorious school days... It's no wonder they went so quickly with all the exams, the classroom fun, the sticky situations to get out of, the work to avoid and the teachers to annoy. Enjoy this new collection of hilarious exam answers, along with schoolyard jokes, amusing doodles, silly excuses, spelling slip-ups and loads more!

2. Record Nr.	UNINA9910972000003321
Autore	Niemeck Maik
Titolo	First-Person Thought : Action, Identification and Experience / Maik Niemeck
Pubbl/distr/stampa	Paderborn, : Brill mentis, 2022
ISBN	3-96975-264-7
Edizione	[1st ed.]
Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (242 pages)
Disciplina	153
Soggetti	Selbstbewusstsein Bewusstsein Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation De Se Skeptizismus Indexikalische Gedanken Selbstsorge Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein Emotionen Selbst-Repräsentationalismus Self-Consciousness Consciousness Immunity to Error through Misidentification De Se Skepticism Indexical Thought Self-Concern Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness Emotions Self-Representationalism
Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
Formato	Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico	Monografia
Note generali	Includes index.
Nota di contenuto	Intro -- Content -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought? -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2

The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them -- 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM) -- 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis -- 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model -- 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action -- 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought -- 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech -- 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum? -- Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots -- 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern? -- 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component -- 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern -- 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself? -- 2.7 Some Empirical Support -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Getting IEM right -- 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification -- 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification -- 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types? -- 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens? -- 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens -- 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition? -- 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence -- 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession -- 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification. 3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility -- 3.7.4 Résumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM? -- 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought -- 3.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification -- 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw? -- 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument -- 4.4.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs? -- 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries? -- 4.5.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem -- 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception -- Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections -- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness -- 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Self-Representationalism -- 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism -- 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character -- 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content? -- 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves? -- 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between? -- 6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism -- 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience. 6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing -- 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode -- 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning

Sommario/riassunto

The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called *de se* skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
