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Misperception 1983: Able Archer Exercise; What Lessons Can Be Drawn from These Crises?; Superiority Is Not the Decisive Factor; But Numbers Do Matter; Leadership Lies at the Very Core of Deterrence; Deterrence Is About Behavior in Daily Life, Not in Brief Crises; The Ability to Take Risks Is Part of Any Success Story; Different Approaches to "Rationality" Should Be Acknowledged; Prudence Should Prevent Unnecessary Risk-Taking; Ignorance Is Blissful-but Dangerous; Subtleties of Deterrence Theory Play Little Role in Times of Crisis  
Strategic Thinkers Nonetheless Had a Far-Reaching Effect on Defense Policy On the Whole, Blatant Moves or Threats, When Credible, Were More Successful Than Uncertainty; Participants Are Never in Full Control of Events; The Past Contains Significant Experience Related to Asia; CHAPTER FIVE: The Age of Small Powers; Iran; North Korea; Pakistan; Syria; Some Thoughts Concerning Small States and International Security; CHAPTER SIX: Ahead of Us: The Big Piracy Game?; China; Russia; An Elusive Strategic Stability; CHAPTER SEVEN: Space and Cyberdeterrence; Space; Cyberspace; Conclusion; References  
About the Author

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Sommario/riassunto

Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.

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