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Sommario/riassunto

Countries throughout the world have passed regulations that promise protection for workers and the environment, but violations of these policies are more common than compliance. All too often, limitations of state capacity and political will intertwine hindering enforcement. Why do states enforce regulations in some places, and in some industries, but not in others? In *Politicized Enforcement in Argentina*, Amengual develops a framework for analyzing enforcement in middle-income and developing countries, showing how informal linkages between state officials and groups within society allow officials to gain the operational resources and political support necessary for enforcement. This analysis builds on state-society approaches in comparative politics, but in contrast to theories that emphasize state autonomy, it focuses on key differences in the way states are porous to political influence.
