

1.	Record Nr.	UNINA990000807400403321
	Titolo	Il codice Flora : una pinacoteca miniata nella Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli / a cura di Romeo De Maio
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	Napoli : Tullio Pironti, c1992
	Descrizione fisica	238 p. : antip., in gran parte ill. color. ; 41 cm
	Locazione	FARBC
	Collocazione	RARI F 31
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Italiano
	Formato	Materiale a stampa
	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Note generali	Ed. di 1400 copie numerate: copia numerata a mano n. 279
2.	Record Nr.	UNINA9910957922703321
	Autore	Ule Aljaz
	Titolo	Partner choice and cooperation in networks : theory and experimental evidence / / Aljaz Ule
	Pubbl/distr/stampa	Berlin, : Springer, 2008
	ISBN	9786611179403 9781281179401 128117940X 9783540730163 3540730168
	Edizione	[1st ed. 2008.]
	Descrizione fisica	1 online resource (212 p.)
	Collana	Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; ; 598
	Disciplina	302.14
	Soggetti	Cooperation Social networks Cooperativeness Social conflict
	Lingua di pubblicazione	Inglese
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	Livello bibliografico	Monografia
	Note generali	Description based upon print version of record.

Nota di bibliografia	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nota di contenuto	Motivation and Outline -- Basic Concepts of the Theories of Games, Networks and Markov Chains -- The Network Dilemma Game -- Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Network Dilemma Games -- Exclusion and Cooperation in Experiments -- Dynamics of Partner Choice and Cooperation.
Sommario/riassunto	Cooperation is beneficial but may be hard to achieve in situations where the selfish interests of individuals conflict with their common goal, such as in sharing of goods, help, knowledge or information, in trade and pollution negotiations, and in exploitation of common resources. The standard models of such "social dilemmas" assume that the individuals are obliged to participate in the dilemma. These models fail to capture an important element of human interaction: that people are in general free to select their interaction partners. In this book a social dilemma with partner selection is introduced and studied with the methods of formal game theory, experimental economics and computer simulations. It allows exploration of simultaneous dynamics of the network structure and cooperative behavior on this structure. The results of this study show that partner choice strongly facilitates cooperation and leads to networks where free-riders are likely to be excluded.