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	Soggetti	Selbstbewusstsein Bewusstsein Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation De Se Skeptizismus Indexikalische Gedanken Selbstsorge Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein Emotionen Selbst-Repräsentationalismus Self-Consciousness Consciousness Immunity to Error through Misidentification De Se Skepticism

Indexical Thought
Self-Concern
Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness
Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness
Emotions
Self-Representationalism

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5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections
-- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional
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Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the
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Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections -- Chapter 7.
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Sommario/riassunto

The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called *de se* skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
