00834nam a2200253 i 450099100223102970753620020503162746.0000908s1955 it ||| | ita b10334956-39ule_instEXGIL100419ExLBiblioteca Interfacoltàita195Lombardi, Franco159559Il concetto della libertà /Franco LombardiAsti :Arethusa,1955190 p.Libertà.b1033495602-04-1427-06-02991002231029707536LE002 195 LOM C 02LE002 Fil. I G 2012002000401557le002-E0.00-l- 00000.i1039363827-06-02Concetto della libertà199524UNISALENTOle00201-01-00ma -itait 3103247nam 22004815 450 991034954750332120240508233121.09783030216757303021675610.1007/978-3-030-21675-7(CKB)4100000009152691(MiAaPQ)EBC5887826(DE-He213)978-3-030-21675-7(Perlego)3492839(EXLCZ)99410000000915269120190827d2019 u| 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierPhilosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science /by Graham McFee1st ed. 2019.Cham :Springer International Publishing :Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan,2019.1 online resource (348 pages)9783030216740 3030216748 Includes bibliographical references and index.Chapter One: Introductory - A still point in a turning world? -- Chapter Two: Persons as Agents: The Possibility of Genuine Action -- Chapter Three: What Persons Are: Identity, Personal Identity and Composition -- Chapter Four: What Persons are Not: Causality, Minds and the Brain -- Chapter Five: Evolutionary Explanation in Psychology: Not an Issue for Philosophy? -- Chapter Six: Persons, Artificial Intelligence, and Science Fiction Thought-Experiments -- Chapter Seven: Considerations of Exceptionlessness in Philosophy: or, 'Everything ... ' -- Chapter Eight: Philosophy without Exceptionlessness -- Chapter Nine: Conclusion: The Place of Reason.Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy's possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the "dazzling ideal" of science. This 'dazzling ideal' incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation-whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained-and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy (and its truth-claims), McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science (properly understood) its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive(and pernicious) requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation.Philosophy of mindSelfPhilosophy of the SelfPhilosophy of mind.Self.Philosophy of the Self.100100McFee Grahamauthttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut887398BOOK9910349547503321Philosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science2021802UNINA