01607nam 2200421 450 00000979420070503173400.020020131d1932----km-y0itay0103----bafrofrelatFR<<La>> vie de Sainte MargueriteWaceeditée par Elizabeth A. Francis1 0005346Paris<<Edouard >> Champion1932XXXII, 72 p.19 cm.<<Les>> classiques français du Moyen Age71841.1(20. ed.)Poesia francese. Primo periodo, fino al 1400Wace440453Francis,Elizabeth A.ITUniversità della Basilicata - B.I.A.RICAunimarc000009794Vie de Sainte Marguerite76509UNIBASMONLETMONOGRLETTERESTD0010120020131BAS011247STD0010120020201BAS011142TROMBONE0120020507BAS011600TROMBONE2020020524BAS01103620050601BAS011754batch0120050718BAS01105020050718BAS01110920050718BAS01113920050718BAS011153BATCH0020070503BAS011734BAS01BAS01BOOKBASA1Polo Storico-UmanisticoGENCollezione generaleFP/1250612506L125062002013102Prestabile GeneraleBAS01BAS01BOOKBASA1Polo Storico-UmanisticoGENCollezione generaleFP/1289612896L128962002031102Prestabile Generale01362oam 2200385Ka 450 991069822240332120070802085403.0(CKB)1000000000744176(OCoLC)124040055(EXLCZ)99100000000074417620070507d2007 ua 0engtxtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierCourse credit accrual and dropping out of high school[electronic resource][Washington, DC] :U.S. Dept. of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics,[2007]4 unnumbered pages digital, PDF fileIssue briefTitle from title screen (viewed May 4, 2007)Distributed to depository libraries in paper, shipping list no. 2007-0317-P."April 2007."School creditsUnited StatesStatisticsHigh school dropoutsUnited StatesStatisticsStatistics.lcgftSchool creditsHigh school dropoutsNational Center for Education Statistics.GPOGPOGPOBOOK9910698222403321Course credit accrual and dropping out of high school3152844UNINA10897nam 2200517 450 99646440090331620231110221706.03-030-90370-2(CKB)5470000001298844(MiAaPQ)EBC6796397(Au-PeEL)EBL6796397(OCoLC)1282003722(PPN)258296496(EXLCZ)99547000000129884420220721d2021 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierDecision and game theory for security 12th international conference, GameSec 2021, virtual event, October 25-27, 2021 : proceedings /Branislav Bǒsanský [and three others] (editors)Cham, Switzerland :Springer,[2021]©20211 online resource (385 pages)Lecture Notes in Computer Science ;v.130613-030-90369-9 Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- Theoretical Foundations in Equilibrium Computation -- Computing Nash Equilibria in Multiplayer DAG-Structured Stochastic Games with Persistent Imperfect Information -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Imperfect-Information Naval Strategic Planning Problem -- 3 Algorithm -- 4 Procedure for Computing Degree of Nash Equilibrium Approximation -- 5 Experiments -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Two Algorithms for Computing Exact and Approximate Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Notation -- 1.2 Outline of the Paper -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Strategically Equivalent Games -- 2.2 Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- 3 A Fast Algorithm to Compute Strategically Equivalent Zero-Sum Games -- 3.1 Algorithmic Implications for Matrices in Mmn(R) -- 3.2 A Simple Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors -- 3.3 Algorithm and Simulations -- 3.4 Numerical Results -- 4 Approximate Nash Equilibrium Through an Affine Transformation -- 4.1 Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- 4.2 Algorithmic Implementation -- 4.3 Numerical Simulation -- 5 Conclusion -- A Some Auxiliary Results on Mmn(R) -- References -- Separable Network Games with Compact Strategy Sets -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Network Games -- 3 Example: Security Game -- 3.1 Security Game with the Tullock Function -- 4 Polynomial Network Games -- 4.1 Moment-Based Formulation -- 4.2 Nonnegative Polynomials Using Sums of Squares -- 4.3 Hierarchy of Semidefinite Relaxations -- 4.4 Examples -- 5 Conclusions -- References -- Machine Learning and Game Theory -- Countering Attacker Data Manipulation in Security Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Preliminaries -- 3.1 Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) -- 3.2 Partial Behavior Deception Model -- 3.3 Cognitive Hierarchy Approach -- 4 Finding Non-deceptive Attacker Behavior -- 4.1 Characterizing Deceptive Attacker's Behavior.4.2 RaBiS: Characterizing Behavior of Non-deceptive Attacker -- 4.3 Principled Approach for Low-Data Challenge -- 5 Maximin to Optimize Defender Utility -- 6 Experiments -- 7 Conclusion -- A Appendix -- A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 -- References -- Scalable Optimal Classifiers for Adversarial Settings Under Uncertainty -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Work -- 2 Model -- 2.1 Setting and Notation -- 2.2 Preliminary: Reduction of Dimensionality -- 2.3 Model Discussion -- 3 BNE Characterization and Computation -- 3.1 Equilibrium Characterization -- 3.2 Scalable Approximate Computation -- 3.3 Numerical Illustration -- 4 Online Learning -- 5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Learning Generative Deception Strategies in Combinatorial Masking Games -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Deception Through Attribute Masking -- 4 Computing Equilibrium Deception Strategies -- 4.1 Computing the Attacker's Best Response -- 4.2 Computing the Defender's Best Response -- 4.3 Computing Equilibrium Deception -- 4.4 Scalable Approximation of Equilibrium Deception Through Generative Adversarial Masking -- 5 Extension to Multiple Devices -- 6 Experiments -- 6.1 Near-Optimality of Generative Adversarial Masking -- 6.2 Systematic Large-Scale Experiments -- 7 Case Study -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Network Games with Strategic Machine Learning -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Game Model -- 2.1 Interdependent in Decision Outcomes (Type 1) -- 2.2 Interdependent in Observable Features (Type 2) -- 3 Equilibrium Analysis-Linear Mechanisms -- 3.1 Type 1 Model Analysis -- 3.2 Type 2 Model Analysis -- 4 Equilibrium Analysis-Linear Threshold Mechanisms -- 4.1 Type 1 Model Analysis -- 4.2 Type 2 Model Analysis -- 5 Numerical Results -- 5.1 Type 1 Model, Linear Mechanism -- 5.2 Type 2 Model, Linear Mechanism -- 5.3 Type 1 Model, Linear Threshold Mechanism.5.4 Type 2 Model, Linear Threshold Mechanism -- 6 Discussion -- 6.1 Comparisons with Previous Works -- 7 Conclusion -- A Proof of Lemma1 -- B Proof of Proposition1 -- C Proof of Proposition2 -- D Proof of Lemma2 -- E Proof of Proposition3 -- F Proof of Lemma3 -- G Proof of Lemma4 -- H Proof of Lemma5 -- I Proof of Lemma6 -- J Proof of Proposition4 -- K Proof of Proposition5 -- References -- No Time to Lie: Bounds on the Learning Rate of a Defender for Inferring Attacker Target Preferences -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Model -- 4 Lower Bound on the Number of Observations -- 5 Upper Bound on the Number of Observations -- 6 Simulation Results -- 7 Conclusion -- A Proof of Lemma4 -- B Proof of Lemma5 -- References -- When Should You Defend Your Classifier? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 The Advanced Adversarial Classification Game -- 3.1 Adversary -- 3.2 Defender -- 3.3 Cost of Pure Strategies -- 3.4 Utility of Mixed Strategies -- 3.5 Expected Payouts for Mixed Strategies -- 4 Game Instantiation and Analysis -- 4.1 Best Response Analysis of the Adversary -- 4.2 Best Response Analysis of the Defender -- 4.3 (Fully) Mixed Nash Equilibria -- 4.4 Results -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Ransomware -- A Mechanism Design Approach to Solve Ransomware Dilemmas -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 System Model -- 4 Proposed Mechanisms -- 4.1 Ransomware-Dilemma-1 -- 4.2 Ransomware-Dilemma-2 -- 5 Smart-Contract Implementation -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Winning the Ransomware Lottery -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Probability and Lotteries -- 4 Paying to Play -- 4.1 Lowering the Value of Payments -- 4.2 Increasing Costs -- 4.3 Decreasing Payment Probability -- 5 Lowering the Stakes -- 5.1 Decreasing Attack Success -- 5.2 Cyber Insurance -- 5.3 Use of Decrypters -- 5.4 Off-Site Backups.5.5 Impact of Mitigations -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Combating Ransomware in Internet of Things: A Games-in-Games Approach for Cross-Layer Cyber Defense and Security Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Work -- 1.2 Organization of the Paper -- 2 Problem Formulation -- 2.1 Basic Settings -- 2.2 Multi-phase Multi-stage Game Formulation -- 2.3 Cyber Markov Game for Ransomware Penetration -- 2.4 Solution Concept -- 3 Ransomware Game Analysis -- 3.1 Risk Assessment Outcome of the Cyber Markov Game -- 3.2 Equilibria of the Ransomware Game -- 4 Sensitivity Analysis and Impact of Human Factors -- 4.1 Impact of the Security Budget -- 4.2 Impact of Human Factors and Prospect Theory -- 5 Case Studies and Discussion -- 5.1 Model Implementation -- 5.2 Outcome of Cyber Markov Game -- 5.3 Impact of Budget -- 5.4 Prospect Theory -- 6 Conclusion -- A Proof in the Budget Dilemma -- References -- Cyber-physical Systems Security -- A Game-Theoretic Framework for Controlled Islanding in the Presence of Adversaries -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Model and Preliminaries -- 3.1 Power System Model -- 3.2 Stackelberg Game -- 4 Problem Formulation -- 4.1 Adversary Model -- 4.2 Grid Operator Model -- 4.3 Interaction Model Between the Grid Operator and Adversary -- 5 Solution Approach -- 5.1 Mixed Integer Nonlinear Bi-level Optimization Formulation -- 5.2 Double Oracle Algorithm Based Approach -- 6 Numerical Evaluations -- 6.1 Simulation Setup -- 6.2 Case Study Results -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Game Theoretic Hardware Trojan Testing Under Cost Considerations -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Game Theoretic Trojan Testing Under Cost Considerations -- 3 Game Theoretic Trojan Testing Under a Cost Budget Constraint -- 3.1 NE Under Sufficient Cost Budget of the Defender -- 3.2 NE Under Insufficient Cost Budget of the Defender -- 4 Numerical Results -- 5 Conclusion.References -- Strategic Remote Attestation: Testbed for Internet-of-Things Devices and Stackelberg Security Game for Optimal Strategies -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Software Vulnerabilities and Exploitation in IoT Devices -- 2.2 IoT Remote Attestation -- 2.3 Stackelberg Security Games -- 3 Testbed Design and Development -- 3.1 Testbed Components -- 3.2 Testbed Development -- 4 Game-Theoretic Model of Remote Attestation -- 4.1 Environment and Players -- 4.2 Strategy Spaces -- 4.3 Utility Functions -- 4.4 Solution Concept -- 5 Analysis of Optimal Attestation Strategies -- 5.1 Case 1: Single Device and Single Attestation Method -- 5.2 Case 2: Multiple Devices and Single Device Class -- 5.3 Case 3: Multiple Devices and Multiple Device Classes -- 6 Numerical Results -- 6.1 Experimental Results from the Remote Attestation Testbed -- 6.2 Evaluation of Game-Theoretic Model and Optimal Strategies -- 7 Related Work -- 7.1 IoT Security Testbeds -- 7.2 Remote Attestation -- 7.3 Stackelberg Security Games -- 8 Conclusion and Future Work -- References -- Innovations in Attacks and Defenses -- Bet and Attack: Incentive Compatible Collaborative Attacks Using Smart Contracts -- 1 Introduction -- 2 A Model for a CSC-Based Collaborative Attack -- 2.1 Blockchain Model -- 2.2 Threat Model -- 2.3 Attack Model -- 3 Game Theoretic Model and Analysis -- 3.1 Attackers Contribution -- 3.2 Interdependent Attackers Game (IAG) -- 3.3 Equilibrium Analysis -- 4 Exploring Incentive Compatibility -- 4.1 Mechanism Formulation -- 4.2 Incentive Compatible Property -- 4.3 Budget Constraint -- 4.4 Voluntary Participation Constraint -- 4.5 Fairness -- 5 Numerical Simulations and Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Combating Informational Denial-of-Service (IDoS) Attacks: Modeling and Mitigation of Attentional Human Vulnerability -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Works.1.2 Notations and Organization of the Paper.Lecture notes in computer science ;13061.Computer securityCongressesGame theoryCongressesComputer securityGame theory005.8Bǒsanský BranislavMiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK996464400903316Decision and Game Theory for Security3032452UNISA04307oam 2200625I 450 991080003840332120240131144217.01-283-97263-80-203-07505-61-135-11798-510.4324/9780203075050 (CKB)2670000000325556(EBL)1114650(OCoLC)827208977(SSID)ssj0000822249(PQKBManifestationID)12348735(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000822249(PQKBWorkID)10757566(PQKB)11105503(MiAaPQ)EBC1114650(Au-PeEL)EBL1114650(CaPaEBR)ebr10650310(CaONFJC)MIL428513(OCoLC)826652830(FINmELB)ELB133532(EXLCZ)99267000000032555620180706d2013 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrMoney and banking in Jean-Baptiste Say's economic thought /Gilles JacoudNew York, N.Y. :Routledge,2013.1 online resource (289 p.)Routledge studies in the history of economics ;151Routledge studies in the history of economics ;151Description based upon print version of record.1-138-90363-9 0-415-67737-8 Includes bibliographical references and index.Introduction / Gilles Jacoud -- Extracts from the Catechism of political economy / Jean-Baptiste Say -- Of money -- Of the representative signs of money -- Of monies : extracts from the complete course in practical political economy / Jean-Baptiste Say -- Of the nature and uses of money -- Of the material of money -- Of the foundation of the value of monies -- Why the value of silver did not decrease more following the discovery of America -- Of the relative value of different metals used as money -- Of the manufacture of metallic monies -- Of the profit it is possible to make from the manufacture of coinage -- Of the attempts which have been made to have a measure of values -- Of the value of precious metals compared with that of wheat, from ancient times -- Evaluation of historical amounts -- Of paper monies -- Of the representative signs of money : extracts from the complete course in practical political economy / Jean-Baptiste Say -- General characteristics of representative signs -- Of trust notes and banks of circulation -- Abuse of banks of circulation -- Of deposit banks and party transfers -- Of promissory notes, bills of exchange and foreign exchange -- Extracts from a Treatise on Political Economy / Jean-Baptiste Say -- Extracts from editions 1, 2 and 3 of a Treatise on political economy -- Extracts from editions 5 and 6 of a Treatise on political economy -- Manuscripts, notes and varied texts / Jean-Baptiste Say -- Tribunat : report made on behalf of the finance section on the projected law concerning the recoinage of monies -- Notes on Henri Storch's Cours d'économie politique -- Of the commercial crisis in England -- Extracts from correspondence -- Plan for a new money in Ricardo's style -- Of deposit banks and party transfers -- Of the debasement of monies -- Chronological table / Gilles Jacoud.The aim of this work is to make available to English-language readers a translation of Jean-Baptiste Say's main texts on money and banking which were not at present accessible in English. The work includes chapters from his books taking into account the variants between the different editions, articles and hitherto unpublished manuscripts. Comprehension of these different texts is facilitated by an introduction designed to place them in their context and by a chronological table giving the main events of Say's life and editorial activity in parallel with the main political, economic Routledge Studies in the History of EconomicsEconomicsEconomics.332.101Jacoud Gilles.856147MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910800038403321Money and banking in Jean-Baptiste Say's economic thought3874376UNINA