05590nam 22009855 450 99624799840331620230828215226.00-674-03390-610.4159/harvard.9780674033900(CKB)2550000001193153(MH)011432624-X(SSID)ssj0001114571(PQKBManifestationID)11636971(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001114571(PQKBWorkID)11055448(PQKB)11212159(SSID)ssj0000941160(PQKBManifestationID)11613889(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941160(PQKBWorkID)10963852(PQKB)11607853(DE-B1597)209905(OCoLC)877009841(OCoLC)979721323(DE-B1597)9780674033900(EXLCZ)99255000000119315320190708d2009 fg engur|||||||||||txtccrNexus Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I /Jonathan Reed WinklerCambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, [2009]©20081 online resource (347 p. )ill., maps ;Harvard Historical Studies ;162Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-674-02839-2 Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-336) and index. Frontmatter -- Contents -- Maps and Figures -- Introduction -- ONE The Information Network and the Outbreak of War -- TWO Neutrality and Vulnerability -- THREE Security and Radios -- FOUR At War in Europe -- FIVE In Pursuit of Cables to Asia and the Americas -- SIX Radio, the Navy, and Latin America -- SEVEN The Quest for Independence -- EIGHT The Illusion of Success -- Conclusion -- Abbreviations -- Primary Sources -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- IndexIn an illuminating study that blends diplomatic, military, technology, and business history, Jonathan Reed Winkler shows how U.S. officials during World War I discovered the enormous value of global communications. At the outbreak of war in 1914, British control of the cable network affected the Americans' ability to communicate internationally, and the development of radio worried the Navy about hemispheric security. The benefits of a U.S. network became evident during the war, especially in the gathering of intelligence. This led to the creation of a peacetime intelligence operation, later termed the "Black Chamber," that was the forerunner of the National Security Agency. After the war, U.S. companies worked to expand network service around the world but faced industrial limitations. Focused on security concerns, the Wilson administration objected to any collaboration with British companies that might alleviate this problem. Indeed, they went so far as to create a radio monopoly and use warships to block the landing of a cable at Miami. These efforts set important precedents for later developments in telephony, shortwave radio, satellites-even the internet. In this absorbing history, Winkler sheds light on the early stages of the global infrastructure that helped launch the United States as the predominant power of the century. Harvard historical studies ;v. 162.World War, 1914-1918United StatesWorld War, 1914-1918Diplomatic historyNational securityUnited StatesHistory20th centuryStrategyHistory20th centuryWorld War, 1914-1918CommunicationsCommunication, InternationalHistory20th centuryCommunication in politicsUnited StatesHistory20th centuryWorld War, 1914-1918Diplomatic history20th centuryUnited StatesWorld War, 1914-1918History20th centuryUnited StatesNational securityHistory20th centuryUnited StatesStrategyCommunications20th CenturyWorld War, 1914-1918HistoryCommunication, InternationalHistoryCommunication in politicsHistory & ArchaeologyHILCCHistory - GeneralHILCCUnited StatesForeign relations1913-1921World War, 1914-1918World War, 1914-1918Diplomatic history.National securityHistoryStrategyHistoryWorld War, 1914-1918Communications.Communication, InternationalHistoryCommunication in politicsHistoryWorld War, 1914-1918Diplomatic historyWorld War, 1914-1918HistoryNational securityHistoryStrategyCommunicationsWorld War, 1914-1918HistoryCommunication, InternationalHistoryCommunication in politicsHistory & ArchaeologyHistory - General358Winkler Jonathan Reed , 944843DE-B1597DE-B1597BOOK996247998403316Nexus2325122UNISAThis Record contains information from the Harvard Library Bibliographic Dataset, which is provided by the Harvard Library under its Bibliographic Dataset Use Terms and includes data made available by, among others the Library of Congress