01265nam--2200385---450 99000159416020331620200908101937.0000159416USA01000159416(ALEPH)000159416USA0100015941620040422d1982----km-y0itay0103----baitaIT||||||||001yyDocumenti e regesti per servire alla storia dello Stato d'Urbino e dei Conti di MontefeltroGino FranceschiniUrbinoArgalia19822 volumi30 cmin testa al frontespizio: Università degli studi di Urbinovol 1 : 1202-1375, P. 319 - vol 2 : 1376-1404, P. XII, 32720012001001-------2001UrbinoStoria1202 - 1404Montefeltro (famiglia)Storia945.677FRANCESCHINI,GinoITsalbcISBD990001594160203316X.1.A. 147/1 (XI A 10/1)12548 L.M.XI AX.1.A. 147/2 (XI A 10/2)12549 L.M.XI ABKUMADocumenti e regesti per servire alla storia dello Stato d'Urbino e dei Conti di Montefeltro939135UNISA05519oam 22013334 450 991097043760332120250426110604.097866128443489781462300266146230026X978128284434612828443429781452770239145277023997814518738011451873808(CKB)3170000000055377(SSID)ssj0000940759(PQKBManifestationID)11499073(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940759(PQKBWorkID)10956005(PQKB)11478044(OCoLC)680613667(MiAaPQ)EBC1608857(IMF)WPIEE2009233(IMF)WPIEA2009233WPIEA2009233(EXLCZ)99317000000005537720020129d2009 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrExcessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations /Andréas Georgiou1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.25 p. illIMF Working Papers"October 2009."9781451917987 1451917988 Includes bibliographical references.Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. The Analytical Framework -- A. The Basic Model -- B. Different Sources of Finance -- C. Choice of Project Riskiness -- D. Change in the Cost of Loanable Funds -- E. Changes in the Probability Distribution Function of the Debt-Financed Project -- III. Some Thoughts on Policy Implications -- IV. Conclusion -- Appendix -- References.The financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought to the fore the issues of excesses in lending, leverage, and risk-taking as some of the fundamental causes of this crisis. At the same time, in dealing with the financial crisis there have been large scale interventions by governments, often referred to as bailouts of the lenders. This paper presents a framework where rational economic agents engage in ex ante excessive lending, borrowing, and risk-taking if creditors assign a positive probability to being bailed out. The paper also offers some thoughts on policy implications. It argues that it would be most productive for the long run if lending institutions were not bailed out. If the continuing existence of an institution was deemed essential, assistance should take the form of capital injections that dilute the equity of existing owners.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/233Financial crisesEconometric modelsEconomic policyMathematical modelsFinancial riskCapital marketGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009Banks and BankingimfBanksimfCapital and Ownership StructureimfCredit riskimfCreditimfDepository InstitutionsimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinanceimfFinancial CrisesimfFinancial crisesimfFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfFinancial risk managementimfFinancial services law & regulationimfFinancing PolicyimfGoodwillimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfLoansimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMonetary economicsimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfMortgagesimfProject loansimfValue of FirmsimfFinancial crisesEconometric models.Economic policyMathematical models.Financial risk.Capital market.Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.Banks and BankingBanksCapital and Ownership StructureCredit riskCreditDepository InstitutionsEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinanceFinancial CrisesFinancial crisesFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementFinancial Risk ManagementFinancial risk managementFinancial services law & regulationFinancing PolicyGoodwillIndustries: Financial ServicesLoansMicro Finance InstitutionsMonetary economicsMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyMortgagesProject loansValue of Firms338.5;338.542Georgiou Andréas1815847International Monetary Fund.Statistics Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910970437603321Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations4371380UNINA