01264nam--2200349---450 99000089724020331620210412100400.00089724USA010089724(ALEPH)000089724USA01008972420020123d1993----km-y0itay0103----baitaIT||||||||001yy<<Le>> relazioni tra italia e Albaniaatti del Congresso di Ancona-Fabriano-Senigallia30 gennaio-1 febbraio 192RomaCentro studi sulla storia e civiltà adriatica1993XXI, 244 p25 cmCongressi sule relazioni tra le due sponde adriatiche N.S.12001Congressi sule relazioni tra le due sponde adriatiche N.S.1ItaliaRelazioni con l'AlbaniaAtti di Congressi1992AlbaniaRelazioni con l'ItaliaAtti di Congressi1992CongressiAncona-Fabriano-Senigallia1992327.4504965ITsalbcISBD990000897240203316X.3.B. 483(III E 1885)116640 L.M.III EX.3.B. 483a(III E 1885bis)146356 L.M.III EBKUMARelazioni tra italia e Albania970079UNISA03509nam 22005053 450 991016319170332120230803215336.097817828958791782895876(CKB)3810000000097898(MiAaPQ)EBC5625972(Au-PeEL)EBL5625972(CaPaEBR)ebr11642220(OCoLC)1081000607(Perlego)3020840(EXLCZ)99381000000009789820210901d2014 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierInnovator Or Imitator1st ed.Chicago :Wagram Press,2014.©2014.1 online resource (41 pages)Intro -- TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- BOURCET -- GUIBERT -- NAPOLEON'S OPERATIONAL APPROACH -- THE 1805 ULM CAMPAIGN: THE NAPOLEONIC APPROACH IN ACTION -- CONCLUSION -- Bibliography -- Primary Sources -- Secondary Sources.In 1805, a new style of operational warfare burst upon the fields of Europe as Napoleon Bonaparte's Grand Army swept from the Rhine to the Danube surrounding the Austrian army at Ulm and initiating a revolution in military affairs (RMA) whose effects are still felt today. The question remains whether this new style of warfare was merely a natural outgrowth of the work of 18th century military thinkers, whose theories were imitated by a dynamic leader, or did Napoleon bring something new to warfare, a true innovation in the conduct of operational warfare? This is the central question that this monograph will attempt to answer. David Chandler maintains that "Napoleon contributed little new." As we struggle today with the implications of a possible RMA, it is important that we fully understand the forces that caused former RMA's to occur. For the historian, it is also important that we get our interpretations of past events as correct as possible. Was this a RMA that would have happened with any energetic leader who strictly followed the teachings of Bourcet and Guibert, as a sort of TTP put together by theorists, or did Napoleon take their theories, and meld them with his own ideas to create a new form of warfare and initiate a RMA? Does a true RMA require more than just theories and doctrine, does it require an inquiring mind on the part of the practitioner as well? These questions give relevance to the research question of this monograph. The monograph concludes that Napoleon did not imitate the two thinkers, and that the RMA initiated by him was more than just an implementation of techniques proposed by theorists. The RMA in 1805 required an imaginative practitioner who could grasp the salient features of theory and put them to use in new ways. To initiate the RMA innovation by the war fighter was required, not mere imitation. Innovator Or ImitatorOperational art (Military science)Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821Command of troopsOperational art (Military science)Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821.Command of troops.944.05092000000002Wasson Lt.-Col James N1375397MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910163191703321Innovator Or Imitator3409769UNINA