01073nam--2200349---450-9900003599002033160035990USA010035990(ALEPH)000035990USA01003599020010315d1977----km-y0itay0103----baengUS||||||||001yyFlow analysis of computer programsMatthew S. HechtNew YorkNorth Holland1977XIII, 232 p.23 cmThe computer science libraryProgramming languages series2001The computer science libraryProgramming languages series001-------2001001.61HECHT,Matthew S.26778ITsalbcISBD990000359900203316001.61 HEC6436001.6100105513BKSCIPATTY9020010315USA01104420020403USA011644PATRY9020040406USA011625Flow analysis of computer programs333237UNISA03656nam 2200637 450 99623484110331620230807193406.03-11-044536-03-11-044562-X10.1515/9783110445626(CKB)3710000000482433(EBL)4006864(SSID)ssj0001543293(PQKBManifestationID)16135723(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001543293(PQKBWorkID)14366536(PQKB)10360994(MiAaPQ)EBC4006864(DE-B1597)457247(OCoLC)945755531(OCoLC)952807775(DE-B1597)9783110445626(EXLCZ)99371000000048243320151124h20152015 uy 0engur|nu---|u||utxtccrTowards a theory of epistemically significant perception how we relate to the world /Nadja El KassarBerlin, [Germany] :De Gruyter,2015.©20151 online resource (376 p.)Ideen & Argumente,1862-1147Description based upon print version of record.3-11-057827-1 3-11-044521-2 Includes bibliographical references and indexes.Front matter --Acknowledgments --Contents --Introduction --Part I Conceptualism --1 Introducing Conceptualism --2 Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments against Conceptualism --3 Examining McDowell's Revised Conceptualism --Part II Relationism --4 Relationism: Perception as Conscious Acquaintance --5 Relationism as Anti-Representationalism --6 Why McDowell's Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis's Anti-Representationalist Criticism --Part III Relational Conceptualism --7 Relational Conceptualism: a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception --8 Possible Objections against Relational Conceptualism --Part IV. Relational Conceptualism and Empirical Science --9 Broadening the Scope of Relational Conceptualism --References --Author Index --Subject IndexHow does perceptual experience make us knowledgeable about the world? In this book Nadja El Kassar argues that an informed answer requires a novel theory of perception: perceptual experience involves conceptual capacities and consists in a relation between a perceiver and the world. Contemporary theories of perception disagree about the role of content and conceptual capacities in perceptual experience. In her analysis El Kassar scrutinizes the arguments of conceptualist and relationist theories, thereby exposing their limitations for explaining the epistemic role of perceptual experience. Against this background she develops her novel theory of epistemically significant perception. Her theory improves on current accounts by encompassing both the epistemic role of perceptual experiences and its perceptual character. Central claims of her theory receive additional support from work in vision science, making this book an original contribution to the philosophy of perception.Ideen & Argumente.Perception (Philosophy)ConceptualismRelationismPerception (Philosophy)Conceptualism.Relationism.121/.34El Kassar Nadja1984-1005149MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK996234841103316Towards a theory of epistemically significant perception2310332UNISA01061nam0 22003011i 450 UON0048382120231205105300.13688-07-10099-120171215d1993 |0itac50 baitaIT|||| |||||Dopo la virtusaggio di teoria moraleAlasdair MacIntyre2. edMilanoFeltrinelli1993335 p.22 cm.001UON000661842001 Campi del sapereFILOSOFIA MORALEUONC003250FIITMilanoUONL000005170ETICA (Filosofia morale)21MacintyreAlasdairUONV191328187637FeltrinelliUONV246160650ITSOL20250919RICASIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEOUONSIUON00483821SIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEOSI FS 06259 SI FP 10890 5 Dopo la virtù689709UNIOR