01355nam--2200409---450-99000078147020331620100629125140.00078147USA010078147(ALEPH)000078147USA01007814720011130d1999----km-y0itay0103----bafreFR||||||||001yy<<Le>> conseil d'étatJean Massot et Thierry Girardotpréface de Renaud Denoix de Saint MarcParisLa documentation françaisec1999230 p24 cmNotes et études documentaires5086-872001Notes et études documentaires5086-87FranciaConsiglio di StatoFunzioni342.44MASSOT,Jean245205GIRARDOT,Thierry550350DENOIX DE SAINT MARC,RenaudITsalbcISBD990000781470203316XXX.A. Coll. 150/ 223 (COLL. HCP 5086-87)ECXXX.A. Coll. 150/ 223 (COLL. HCP)00272417BKGIUPATTY9020011130USA011028PATTY9020011130USA01103120020403USA011725PATRY9020040406USA011654RSIAV49020100629USA011251Conseil d'état965380UNISA03361nam 2200637Ia 450 991097473720332120200520144314.09780791482735079148273197814237478571423747852(CKB)1000000000459187(OCoLC)461442888(CaPaEBR)ebrary10579091(SSID)ssj0000128772(PQKBManifestationID)11144544(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128772(PQKBWorkID)10069463(PQKB)11587288(OCoLC)63168591(MdBmJHUP)muse6330(Au-PeEL)EBL3407668(CaPaEBR)ebr10579091(DE-B1597)682481(DE-B1597)9780791482735(MiAaPQ)EBC3407668(Perlego)2671785(EXLCZ)99100000000045918720041119d2005 ub 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrCongressional preemption regulatory federalism /Joseph F. ZimmermanAlbany State University of New York Pressc20051 online resource (303 p.) Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9780791465639 0791465632 Includes bibliographical references (p. 237-278) and index.Front Matter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Congressional Preemption -- Establishment of a Federation -- Spending Power Preemption -- Complete Field Preemption -- Imperium in Imperio and Limited Preemption -- Judicially Determined Preemption -- Metamorphic Federalism -- Notes -- Bibliography -- IndexCongressional Preemption provides an in-depth account of the use of preemption powers by Congress to either partially or completely remove regulatory authority from state and local governments in a wide variety of fields. Author Joseph F. Zimmerman exposes the inadequacies of the two current theories of United States federalism—dual and cooperative—by exploring the impact of Congress' frequent use of its preemption powers since 1965. While the dual and cooperative federalism theories retain a degree of explanatory power, Zimmerman considers why they do not explain the profound systemic changes produced by congressional preemption. Other topics covered include congressional use of conditional grants-in-aid, crossover sanctions, tax credits, tax sanctions, and partial and complete redemption; the theory of political safeguards of federalism; and the Blackmun Thesis, which encourages states to seek relief from preemption statutes in Congress and not the courts. The book concludes with postulates of a broader theory of federalism and recommendations addressed to Congress to reinvigorate the federal system.Federal governmentUnited StatesCentral-local government relationsUnited StatesFederal governmentCentral-local government relations320.473/049Zimmerman Joseph Francis1928-275771MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910974737203321Congressional preemption4355353UNINA