04133nam 2200889Ia 450 991097448640332120241226111256.0978080397962808039796229781446265178144626517X9781283881371128388137397814462315481446231542(CKB)2550000000103807(EBL)1023987(OCoLC)827617330(SSID)ssj0000657114(PQKBManifestationID)11446777(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000657114(PQKBWorkID)10636053(PQKB)10127100(MiAaPQ)EBC1023987(OCoLC)1007859416(StDuBDS)EDZ0000063796(Au-PeEL)EBL1023987(CaPaEBR)ebr10567035(CaONFJC)MIL419387(OCoLC)797835649(FINmELB)ELB133614(PPN)238400468204733(FR-PaCSA)88869180(FRCYB88869180)88869180(EXLCZ)99255000000010380719940928d1995 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierLocal commons and global interdependence heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains /edited by Robert O. Keohane and Elinor OstromLondon ;Thousand Oaks, Calif. Sage Publications1995London ;Thousand Oaks, Calif. :Sage Publications,1995.1 online resource (viii, 261 pages) illustrations"Published under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.""Previously published as a special issue of the Journal of theoretical politics, vol. 6 (1994), no. 4".9781446222010 1446222012 9780803979635 0803979630 Includes bibliographical references and index.Cover; Contents; Notes on Contributors; Chapter 1 - Introduction; Part I - Theoretical Puzzles; Chapter 2 - The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships; Chapter 3 - The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions; Chapter 4 - Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems; Part II - Evidence from the Laboratory; Chapter 5 - Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts; Part III - Evidence from the Field; Chapter 6 - Constituting Social Capital and Collective ActionChapter 7 - The Conditions for Successful Collective Action Chapter 8 - Self-interest and Environmental Management; Chapter 9 - Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution; IndexThis volume offers a synthesis of what is known about very large and very small common-pool resources. At an international level, states cannot appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce agreements they make to cooperate with one another. In some small-scale settings, participants may be just as helpless in calling on distant public officials to monitor and enforce their agreements.International cooperationEnvironmental protectionInternational cooperationCommonsNatural resources, CommunalCommunication in international relationsInternational cooperation.Environmental protectionInternational cooperation.Commons.Natural resources, Communal.Communication in international relations.333.717Keohane Robert O(Robert Owen),1941-267058Ostrom Elinor120863Harvard University.Center for International Affairs.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910974486403321Local commons and global interdependence4341082UNINA