05181oam 22011654 450 991097382820332120250426110730.09786612843983978146235879314623587999781452731902145273190X9781282843981128284398297814518733511451873352(CKB)3170000000055338(SSID)ssj0000943059(PQKBManifestationID)11558965(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943059(PQKBWorkID)10975248(PQKB)11491964(OCoLC)449931755(MiAaPQ)EBC1608809(IMF)WPIEE2009188(IMF)WPIEA2009188WPIEA2009188(EXLCZ)99317000000005533820020129d2009 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrSearch in the Labor Market under Imperfectly Insurable Income Risk /Mauro Roca1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.38 pIMF Working Papers"September 2009."9781451917604 1451917600 Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. The Model -- A. Labor Market -- B. Consumers -- C. Firms -- 1. Wage determination -- D. Government -- E. Stationary Equilibrium -- III. Solution method -- A. Fast-turnover limit -- B. Approximation -- 1. Steady state -- 2. Approximation around steady state -- IV. Quantitative analysis -- A. Calibration -- B. The effects of idiosyncratic risk -- 1. Effects of Idiosyncratic Risk on the Labor Market -- 1. Approximation to Consumption Functions -- 2. Effects of Idiosyncratic Risk on Consumption and Capital -- C. Optimal replacement rate -- 2. Variations in Welfare -- 3. Effects of Unemployment Insurance -- 4. Effects of Idiosyncratic Risk -- V. Conclusions -- I. Derivation of the solution to the wage bargaining -- II. Fast-turnover limit -- A. Derivation of the Euler condition -- B. Derivation of the wage equation -- III. Approximation around the steady state -- A. Response to individual asset holdings -- B. Response to the length of the time interval Δ -- References -- Footnotes.This paper develops a general equilibrium model with unemployment and noncooperative wage determination to analyze the importance of incomplete markets when risk-averse agents are subject to idiosyncratic employment shocks. A version of the model calibrated to the U.S. shows that market incompleteness affects individual behavior and aggregate conditions: it reduces wages and unemployment but increases vacancies. Additionally, the model explains the average level of unemployment insurance observed in the U.S. A key mechanism is the joint influence of imperfect insurance and risk aversion in the wage bargaining. The paper also proposes a novel solution to solve this heterogeneous-agent model.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/188UnemploymentLabor marketUnemployment insuranceActuarial StudiesimfConsumptionimfDemand and Supply of Labor: GeneralimfEconomicsimfIncome economicsimfInsurance & actuarial studiesimfInsurance CompaniesimfInsuranceimfLabor marketimfLabor marketsimfLaborimfLabourimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfSavingimfUnemploymentimfUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job SearchimfWagesimfWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralimfWealthimfUnited StatesimfUnemployment.Labor market.Unemployment insurance.Actuarial StudiesConsumptionDemand and Supply of Labor: GeneralEconomicsIncome economicsInsurance & actuarial studiesInsurance CompaniesInsuranceLabor marketLabor marketsLaborLabourMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionSavingUnemploymentUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job SearchWagesWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralWealth331.1Roca Mauro1816616International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910973828203321Search in the Labor Market under Imperfectly Insurable Income Risk4372865UNINA