01000nam0-22003731i-450 99000076805040332120170530155901.00-246-11504-1000076805FED01000076805(Aleph)000076805FED0100007680520020821d1981----km-y0itay50------baengGBy-------001yyCesar Pelliby John PastierLondon [etc.]GranadaNew York :Whitney library of design1981120 p.ill.24 cmMonographs on Contemporary ArchitecturePelli, Cesar720.924Pastier,John38124ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990000768050403321MON B 56713230FARBCC 866 CAN2619DARPU543057DCATADARPUFARBCDCATACesar Pelli1466785UNINA05637oam 22013574 450 991097335070332120250426110435.0978661382178297814623972281462397220978145199339414519933909781282474253128247425197814527024141452702411(CKB)3360000000443216(EBL)3014487(SSID)ssj0000940715(PQKBManifestationID)11571962(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940715(PQKBWorkID)10956074(PQKB)11782171(OCoLC)694141168(IMF)WPIEE2006146(MiAaPQ)EBC3014487(IMF)WPIEA2006146WPIEA2006146(EXLCZ)99336000000044321620020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrWhat Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : An Analysis of Rent Capture /Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (35 p.)IMF Working Papers"June 2006."9781451864069 145186406X Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/146CorruptionDeveloping countriesPreventionEconometric modelsRent (Economic theory)Econometric modelsTransparency (Ethics) in governmentEconometric modelsAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsimfAggregate Human CapitalimfAggregate Labor ProductivityimfBureaucracyimfCivil service & public sectorimfCivil serviceimfCorporate crimeimfCorruptionimfCriminologyimfDemographic Economics: GeneralimfDemographyimfEmploymentimfIncome economicsimfIntergenerational Income DistributionimfLaborimfLabourimfPopulation & demographyimfPopulation and demographicsimfPopulationimfPublic finance & taxationimfTax incentivesimfTaxationimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfUnemploymentimfWagesimfWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralimfWhite-collar crimeimfBoliviaimfCorruptionPreventionEconometric models.Rent (Economic theory)Econometric models.Transparency (Ethics) in governmentEconometric models.Administrative Processes in Public OrganizationsAggregate Human CapitalAggregate Labor ProductivityBureaucracyCivil service & public sectorCivil serviceCorporate crimeCorruptionCriminologyDemographic Economics: GeneralDemographyEmploymentIncome economicsIntergenerational Income DistributionLaborLabourPopulation & demographyPopulation and demographicsPopulationPublic finance & taxationTax incentivesTaxationTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralUnemploymentWagesWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralWhite-collar crimePaul Elisabeth907258Dabla-Norris Era1815724International Monetary Fund.Middle East and Central Asia Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910973350703321What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail4371358UNINA00779nam0-2200277 --450 991100609430332120250612104159.0978-88-7615-178-120250612d2007----kmuy0itay5050 baitaIT 001yySans papierontologia dell'attualitàMaurizio FerrarisRomaCastelvecchi2007231 p.ill.20 cm<<Le>>navi52Progresso tecnicoEffetti sociali303.483421Ferraris,Maurizio<1956- >10751ITUNINAREICATUNIMARCBK9911006094303321111 FERM 012025/706FLFBCFLFBCSans papier1057447UNINA