05992oam 22014294 450 991097334780332120250426110056.0978661382113397814623962211462396224978145270575014527057559781282447936128244793997814519872561451987250(CKB)3360000000443152(EBL)3014347(SSID)ssj0000940076(PQKBManifestationID)11592415(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940076(PQKBWorkID)10946571(PQKB)10434791(OCoLC)712989247(IMF)WPIEE2006123(MiAaPQ)EBC3014347(IMF)WPIEA2006123WPIEA2006123(EXLCZ)99336000000044315220020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCan Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? /Ashoka Mody, Stefania Fabrizio1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (53 p.)IMF Working Papers"May 2006."9781451863833 1451863837 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE DETERMINANTS OF FISCAL PERFORMANCE: A SELECTIVE LITERATURE REVIEW""; ""III. BUDGET INSTITUTIONS IN NEW AND POTENTIAL EU MEMBER STATES""; ""IV. BENCHMARK RESULTS""; ""V. THE ROLE OF DEEPER DETERMINANTS: TIME-INVARIANT FACTORS""; ""VI. DIFFERENTIATING THE EFFECTS ON EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/123BudgetEuropean Union countriesEconometric modelsFiscal policyEuropean Union countriesEconometric modelsElectionsEconomic aspectsEuropean Union countriesAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: GeneralimfBudget planning and preparationimfBudget SystemsimfBudgetimfBudgeting & financial managementimfBudgetingimfDebt ManagementimfDebtimfDebts, PublicimfExpenditureimfExpenditures, PublicimfFiscal PolicyimfFiscal policyimfFiscal stanceimfIncome economicsimfLaborimfLabourimfMacroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: GeneralimfMacroeconomicsimfNational BudgetimfNational Budget, Deficit, and Debt: GeneralimfNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralimfPublic debtimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfSovereign DebtimfUnemployment rateimfUnemploymentimfUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job SearchimfPoland, Republic ofimfBudgetEconometric models.Fiscal policyEconometric models.ElectionsEconomic aspectsAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: GeneralBudget planning and preparationBudget SystemsBudgetBudgeting & financial managementBudgetingDebt ManagementDebtDebts, PublicExpenditureExpenditures, PublicFiscal PolicyFiscal policyFiscal stanceIncome economicsLaborLabourMacroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: GeneralMacroeconomicsNational BudgetNational Budget, Deficit, and Debt: GeneralNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralPublic debtPublic finance & taxationPublic FinancePublic financial management (PFM)Sovereign DebtUnemployment rateUnemploymentUnemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job SearchMody Ashoka888386Fabrizio Stefania1103907International Monetary Fund.Western Hemisphere Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910973347803321Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline4371223UNINA