01046nam a2200265 i 4500991002454599707536140317s2013 it 000 0 ita d9788838781124b14176956-39ule_instBibl. Dip.le Aggr. Scienze Economia - Sez. Settore Economicoita346.450026Italia423419Codice civile e di procedura civile e leggi complementari3. edSantarcangelo di Romagna :Maggioli,20132106 p. ;15 cmI Codici tascabili ;8Codice civileCodice di procedura civile .b1417695604-04-1417-03-14991002454599707536LE025 ECO 346 ITA01.02 201312025000265790le025Libro di testo a.a. 2013/2014 Prof.ssa Gorgoni-E22.00-l- 00000.i1560325804-04-14Codice civile e di procedura civile e leggi complementari195388UNISALENTOle025 - - ma -itait 0002085 am 22003013u 450 99107658564033212020010910.3726/b12699(CKB)4100000007523740(OAPEN)1003953(EXLCZ)99410000000752374020200109d|||| uy geruuuuu---auuuuThe Balkan Conditional in South SlavicBernPeter Lang International Academic Publishers20031 online resource (320) 3-87690-851-5 This study examines the morphological and semantic development of the modal construction formed with either the imperfect of 'to want' (Croatian/Serbian) plus the infinitive, or with a modal particle from 'to want' (Macedonian) plus the imperfect of the main verb. The Balkan conditional is analyzed using material from diverse sources, including epic folk poetry, dialectal texts, and the standard literary language in the South Slavic languages, as well as in the Balkan non-Slavic languages of Greek, Albanian, Daco-Rumanian, Istro-Rumanian, and Arumanian. Specific syntactic and semantic contexts are analyzed, and the Balkan conditional is compared to other modal constructions in these languages. One of the characteristic analytic verbal forms shared by the languages of the Balkan league is the Balkan conditional or the so-called 'future-in-the-past'. In the majority of these languages, the Balkan conditional has the status of a grammatical category, whose invariant components are 'modality', specifically 'potentiality', and 'reference to past tense'. With such components, these expressions most frequently and naturally refer to actions which did not take place, i.e., the past, contrary-to-fact conditional.Slavistische Beitraege vol. 421LanguagebicsscLanguage491.8/156Belyavski-Frank Mashaaut623213BOOK9910765856403321The Balkan Conditional in South Slavic3021628UNINA07826oam 2200913 c 450 991097200000332120251102090541.03-96975-264-79783969752647(CKB)5720000000034974(MiAaPQ)EBC29731823(Au-PeEL)EBL29731823(Brill | mentis)9783969752647(EXLCZ)99572000000003497420251102d2022 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierFirst-Person ThoughtAction, Identification and ExperienceMaik Niemeck1st ed.PaderbornBrill | mentis20221 online resource (242 pages)Includes index.3-95743-264-2 Intro -- Content -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought? -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them -- 1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM) -- 1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis -- 1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model -- 1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action -- 1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought -- 1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought -- 1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech -- 1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum? -- Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots -- 2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern? -- 2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component -- 2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern -- 2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself? -- 2.7 Some Empirical Support -- 2.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Getting IEM right -- 3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification -- 3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification -- 3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types? -- 3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens? -- 3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens -- 3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition? -- 3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence -- 3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession -- 3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification.3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility -- 3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM? -- 3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought -- 3.8 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification -- 4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw? -- 4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument -- 4.4.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs? -- 4.5 How to Deal with these Worries? -- 4.5.1 The Scope Problem -- 4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem -- 4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception -- Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I' -- 5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections -- 5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation -- 5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness -- 5.4.3 Reply to the Objections -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Self-Representationalism -- 6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism -- 6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character -- 6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content? -- 6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves? -- 6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are? -- 6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between? -- 6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism -- 6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness -- 6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience.6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing -- 6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes? -- 6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode -- 6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations -- 6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account -- 6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections -- Chapter 7. Conclusions -- Literature -- Index.The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.SelbstbewusstseinBewusstseinImmunität gegenüber Fehlern durch FehlidentifikationDe Se SkeptizismusIndexikalische GedankenSelbstsorgeNicht-begriffliches SelbstbewusstseinPrä-reflexivs SelbstbewusstseinEmotionenSelbst-RepräsentationalismusSelf-ConsciousnessConsciousnessImmunity to Error through MisidentificationDe Se SkepticismIndexical ThoughtSelf-ConcernNon-Conceptual Self-ConsciousnessPre-reflective Self-ConsciousnessEmotionsSelf-RepresentationalismSelbstbewusstseinBewusstseinImmunität gegenüber Fehlern durch FehlidentifikationDe Se SkeptizismusIndexikalische GedankenSelbstsorgeNicht-begriffliches SelbstbewusstseinPrä-reflexivs SelbstbewusstseinEmotionenSelbst-RepräsentationalismusSelf-ConsciousnessConsciousnessImmunity to Error through MisidentificationDe Se SkepticismIndexical ThoughtSelf-ConcernNon-Conceptual Self-ConsciousnessPre-reflective Self-ConsciousnessEmotionsSelf-Representationalism153Niemeck Maikaut1792937MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910972000003321First-Person Thought4415361UNINA