00873cam2 22002411 450 SOBE0006703220210630070116.020210630d1956 |||||ita|0103 baitaIT1: 937-1199RomaIstituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo1956XV, 348 p., 4 c. di tav.facs.27 cm001E6002000324282001 <<Le >>carte di S. Erasmo di Veroli / pubblicate dall'Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo ; a cura di Sergio MottironiITUNISOB20210630RICAUNISOBUNISOB900|Coll|32|K14261SOBE00067032M 102 Monografia moderna SBNW900|Coll|32|K000007SI14261rovitoUNISOBUNISOB20210630070055.020210630070116.0rovito1: 937-11991811087UNISOB04827oam 22011174 450 991097018570332120250426110928.0978661284187397814623335921462333591978145199938914519993809781282841871128284187497814518709471451870949(CKB)3170000000055133(EBL)1608045(SSID)ssj0000943962(PQKBManifestationID)11501260(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943962(PQKBWorkID)10982840(PQKB)11227731(OCoLC)460195921(IMF)WPIEE2008236(MiAaPQ)EBC1608045(IMF)WPIEA2008236WPIEA2008236(EXLCZ)99317000000005513320020129d2008 uf 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrA Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (35 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/236Description based upon print version of record.9781451915471 1451915470 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; ReferencesWe present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/236Financial crisesPreventionEconometric modelsMoral hazardEconometric modelsLoans, ForeignEconometric modelsCrisis managementimfCrisis preventionimfCrisis resolutionimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfEconomicsimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial CrisesimfFinancial crisesimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfFinancial risk managementimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfMoral hazardimfPolitical EconomyimfPolitical economyimfPeruimfFinancial crisesPreventionEconometric models.Moral hazardEconometric models.Loans, ForeignEconometric models.Crisis managementCrisis preventionCrisis resolutionEconomic & financial crises & disastersEconomicsFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial CrisesFinancial crisesFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial Risk ManagementFinancial risk managementGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationMoral hazardPolitical EconomyPolitical economy332.152Zettelmeyer Jeromin1814421Jeanne Olivier125747Ostry Jonathan1436213DcWaIMFBOOK9910970185703321A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality4371115UNINA