02965nam 2200661 a 450 991096940810332120240313223002.03-938793-79-13-11-032707-410.1515/9783110327076(CKB)2550000001097229(EBL)1195408(OCoLC)851970752(SSID)ssj0000801277(PQKBManifestationID)11459915(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000801277(PQKBWorkID)10773990(PQKB)10916553(DE-B1597)211606(OCoLC)1013949438(OCoLC)853252218(DE-B1597)9783110327076(Au-PeEL)EBL1195408(CaPaEBR)ebr10728856(CaONFJC)MIL503763(Perlego)651228(MiAaPQ)EBC1195408(EXLCZ)99255000000109722920130709d2008 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrBody, mind and self in Hume's critical realism /Fred WilsonFrankfurt Ontos Verlag20081 online resource (553 p.)Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ;Bd. 22Description based upon print version of record.3-11-032668-X 1-299-72512-0 Includes bibliographical references and index. Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Endnotes to Introduction -- Chapter One: Self as Substance -- Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- Chapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- BackmatterThis essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions ofPhilosophische Analyse ;Bd. 22.Mind and bodySelfMind and body.Self.190Wilson Fred1100427MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910969408103321Body, mind and self in Hume's critical realism4446695UNINA