00925nam0-22002771i-450-99000576137040332119990530000576137FED01000576137(Aleph)000576137FED0100057613719990530d1970----km-y0itay50------bagery---r---00---Sal Romanes und Esprit FrantaisStudien zur Martialrezeption im Frankreich des sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundertsvon Kurt- Henning MehnertBonnRomanisches Seminar der Universität Bonn1970229 p.21 cmRomanistische Versuche und Vorarbeiten33Mehnert,Kurt-Henning220049ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990005761370403321GLOTT. D IV E 39IST. GLOTT. 1601FLFBCFLFBCSal Romanes und Esprit Frantais570665UNINA03040nam 2200709Ia 450 991096922240332120200520144314.09781439902875143990287997814399028511439902852(CKB)2550000001114746(EBL)660530(OCoLC)704558960(SSID)ssj0000467601(PQKBManifestationID)11311405(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000467601(PQKBWorkID)10490546(PQKB)11241922(SSID)ssj0000777041(PQKBManifestationID)12362420(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000777041(PQKBWorkID)10746861(PQKB)21640130(MdBmJHUP)muse13383(Au-PeEL)EBL660530(CaPaEBR)ebr10447301(CaONFJC)MIL1834619(MiAaPQ)EBC660530(Perlego)2034545(EXLCZ)99255000000111474620100706d2011 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCheaper by the hour temporary lawyers and the deprofessionalization of the law /Robert A. Brooks1st ed.Philadelphia Temple University Press20111 online resource (235 p.)Description based upon print version of record.9781439902868 1439902860 9781299833678 1299833675 Includes bibliographical references.Degraded and insecure : the "new" workforce -- "Basically interchangeable" : the creation of the temporary lawyer -- Life on the concourse level : doing document review -- Box shopping in "Nike town" : struggles over work -- "Keeping count of every freakin' minute" : struggles over time -- "A glorified data entry person" : struggles over identity -- "I would rather grow in India" : the emerging legal underclass.Recent law school graduates often work as temporary attorneys, but law firm layoffs and downsizing have strengthened the temporary attorney industry. Cheaper by the Hour is the first book-length account of these workers.Drawing from participant observation and interviews, Robert A. Brooks provides a richly detailed ethnographic account of freelance attorneys in Washington, DC. He places their document review work in the larger context of the deprofessionalization of skilled labor and considers how professionals relegated to temporary jobs feel diminished, degraded, or deLawyersEmploymentUnited StatesTemporary employmentUnited StatesLawyersEmploymentTemporary employment331.25/729Brooks Robert Andrew1813647MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910969222403321Cheaper by the hour4366939UNINA07157oam 22013574 450 991095740800332120250426110735.0978661284093797814623820331462382037978145271175114527117559781282840935128284093297814518700081451870000(CKB)3170000000055039(EBL)1607891(SSID)ssj0000943996(PQKBManifestationID)11564341(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943996(PQKBWorkID)10982913(PQKB)10577213(OCoLC)252871863(MiAaPQ)EBC1607891(IMF)WPIEE2008142(IMF)WPIEA2008142WPIEA2008142(EXLCZ)99317000000005503920020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrConstraints on the Design and Implementation of Monetary Policy in Oil Economies : The Case of Venezuela1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (49 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/142Description based upon print version of record.9781451914535 1451914539 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Dominance in Oil Economies; A. Oil Dominance and Fiscal Dominance: Analytical Framework; B. Transmission Mechanism; III. Oil Economies: Some Stylized Facts; Tables; 1. Exchange Rate and Nominal Anchor for Major OCD in 2005; Figures; 1. OEC: Average Rate of Nominal Growth of Monetary Base and Changes in Oil Prices; 2. OEC: Primary Balance of the General Government; 3. Change in the CPI-OEC and Oil Prices, 1979-2005; IV. Oil Dominance in Venezuela; 4. Selected OEC: Average Δ% Change in the CPI, 1999-2005 Ranked by Xo/XT5. Oil Prices (/B- Venezuelan Basket), and Ratio Xo/XT, 960-20056. Venezuela: Oil in the Economy; 2. Venezuela: Selected Indicators; 7. Venezuela: Rates of Growth of Real GDP, CPI, and Oil Prices; 3. Venezuela: Exchange Rate System, 1964-2007; 8. Venezuela: Ratios of Central Bank Instruments of Monetary Control (CBIMC); A. Oil Dominance/Fiscal Dominance: Simple Correlations; B. Oil Dominance/Fiscal Dominance Hypothesis for Venezuela; V. Conclusions; Appendices; I. Oil Exporting Countries-Selected Indicators; Appendix TablesA.I.1. Classification and Evluation of Oil Exporting Countries, based on the Ratio of Oil Exports to GDPA.I.2. Oil Exporting Countries: Selected Indicators; A.I.3. Oil Exporting Countries: Selected Indicators; A.I.4. Oil Exporting Countries: Selected Indicators; II. Management of Oil Resources: Oil Funds and International Reserves; A.II.1. Venezuela: Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (FEM and Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization (FIEM); A.II.2. Central Bank of Venezuela-Balance Sheet; III. Descriptive Statistics and Pair-Wise Correlations for Selected Economic IndicatorsAppendix FiguresA.III.1. Venezuela: Changes in Oil Prices, Oil Exports, Fiscal Revenue, and Primary Expenditures, 1960-2005; A.III.2. Venezuela: Change in Primary Fiscal Expenditure, Non-Oil GDP Inflation, and Monetary Base, 1960-2005; A.III.3. Venezuela: Five-Year Moving Variences of Rates of Growth of Selected Indicators, 1965-2005; A.III.4. Venezuela: Overall Fiscal Balance and Domestic Primary Deficit (Percentage of GDP); ReferencesBy definition, fiscal dominance impedes the effective implementation of any monetary strategy aimed at controlling inflation. Economies that exhibit oil dominance-a situation in which oil exports largely affect the main macroeconomic indicators-may also exhibit fiscal dominance. However, in this case, the standard indicators used to gauge the presence of fiscal dominance may fail to give the appropriate signals. The main purpose of this paper is twofold: i) to present a simple framework to analyze fiscal dominance in oil exporting countries and ii) to test the hypothesis of the presence of oil dominance/fiscal dominance (OD/FD) in the case of Venezuela. Using VAR and VEC models it is possible to conclude that there is relevant evidence supporting the validity of the OD/FD hypothesis.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/142Petroleum industry and tradeVenezuelaEconometric modelsFiscal policyVenezuelaEconometric modelsMonetary policyVenezuelaEconometric modelsBankingimfBanks and BankingimfBanks and bankingimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfEnergy: Demand and SupplyimfEnergy: GeneralimfExports and ImportsimfExportsimfInternational economicsimfInvestment & securitiesimfInvestments: EnergyimfMacroeconomicsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMonetary baseimfMonetary economicsimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfMoney supplyimfMortgagesimfOil exportsimfOil pricesimfOilimfPetroleum industry and tradeimfPricesimfTrade: GeneralimfVenezuela, República Bolivariana deimfPetroleum industry and tradeEconometric models.Fiscal policyEconometric models.Monetary policyEconometric models.BankingBanks and BankingBanks and bankingBanksDepository InstitutionsEnergy: Demand and SupplyEnergy: GeneralExports and ImportsExportsInternational economicsInvestment & securitiesInvestments: EnergyMacroeconomicsMicro Finance InstitutionsMonetary baseMonetary economicsMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyMoney supplyMortgagesOil exportsOil pricesOilPetroleum industry and tradePricesTrade: General338.272820987DcWaIMFBOOK9910957408003321Constraints on the Design and Implementation of Monetary Policy in Oil Economies4371343UNINA