01149ncm2 22002893i 450 UBO236758920231121125858.0089579336920160701d1996 ||||0itac50 balatusz01d axxe z01n[1]MadisonA-R Editionsc1996LXXXIX, 130 p.Recent researches in the music of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance25001RML00616282001 Recent researches in the music of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance25001UBO23675832001 Beneventanum troporum corpus 2.ordinary chants and tropes for the mass from southern Italy, a.d. 1000-1250. Part 3, Preface chants and Sanctusedited by John Boe1ITIT-0120160701IT-FR0017 Biblioteca umanistica Giorgio ApreaFR0017 NUBO2367589Biblioteca umanistica Giorgio Aprea 52LAB.SLA 291 BTC 2.3A 52COB0000903115 VMN RS C 2016070120160701 52161339UNICAS04509oam 22012254 450 991096875360332120250426110531.0978661382501897814623336461462333648978145279150014527915039781283512565128351256497814519101551451910150(CKB)3360000000443493(EBL)3012561(SSID)ssj0000943219(PQKBManifestationID)11550391(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943219(PQKBWorkID)10975191(PQKB)11699115(OCoLC)568151358(IMF)WPIEE2006302(MiAaPQ)EBC3012561(IMF)WPIEA2006302WPIEA2006302(EXLCZ)99336000000044349320020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrOn Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting /Wilko Bolt, Alexander Tieman1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (18 p.)IMF Working Papers"December 2006."9781451865622 1451865627 Includes bibliographical references (p. 16).""Contents""; ""I Introduction""; ""II Defining the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting""; ""III Equilibrium analysis""; ""IV Finite horizon and equilibrium selection""; ""V An illustrative example""; ""VI Discussion and concluding remarks""; ""Appendix""; ""References""This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/302Game theoryCompetitionMathematical modelsEquilibrium (Economics)Asset pricesimfBankingimfBanks and BankingimfBanks and bankingimfBanksimfCompetitionimfDeflationimfDepository InstitutionsimfEnvironmentimfEnvironmental EconomicsimfEnvironmental economicsimfEnvironmental Economics: GeneralimfEnvironmental sciencesimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfInflationimfMacroeconomicsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPrice LevelimfPricesimfGame theory.CompetitionMathematical models.Equilibrium (Economics)Asset pricesBankingBanks and BankingBanks and bankingBanksCompetitionDeflationDepository InstitutionsEnvironmentEnvironmental EconomicsEnvironmental economicsEnvironmental Economics: GeneralEnvironmental sciencesFinanceFinance: GeneralGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)InflationMacroeconomicsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPrice LevelPricesBolt Wilko1815701Tieman Alexander1815594International Monetary Fund.Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910968753603321On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting4371215UNINA