06089oam 22014774 450 991096822950332120250426110826.09781475511635147551163997814755811711475581173(CKB)2550000000106127(EBL)1606696(SSID)ssj0001101020(PQKBManifestationID)11609134(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001101020(PQKBWorkID)11063694(PQKB)11497081(Au-PeEL)EBL1606696(CaPaEBR)ebr10566297(OCoLC)870244824(IMF)WPIEE2012101(IMF)WPIEA2012101(MiAaPQ)EBC1606696WPIEA2012101(EXLCZ)99255000000010612720020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCentral Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation /Fabian Valencia, Kenichi Ueda1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (28 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/12/101Description based upon print version of record.9781475549683 1475549687 9781475502916 1475502915 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; I: Introduction; II: Model Setup; III: Social Planner Benchmark; IV: Time inconsistency in a dual-mandate central bank; V: Separation of Objectives Achieves Social Optimum; VI: The role of political independence; A: Non-Independent Central Bank and Independent Macro-prudential Regulator; B: Non-Independent Macro-prudential Regulator and Independent Central Bank; VII: Welfare Comparisons; List of Tables; 1 Welfare Loss Across Institutional Arrangements; VIII: Conclusions; References; Appendices; I: Non-Independent Single Authority; II: Distortionary Macro-prudential RegulationWe consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/101Banks and banking, CentralBanks and bankingBanks and BankingimfFinance: GeneralimfInflationimfMacroeconomicsimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfOptimization TechniquesimfProgramming ModelsimfDynamic AnalysisimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfSavingimfWealthimfContingent PricingimfFutures Pricingimfoption pricingimfPrice LevelimfDeflationimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfBankingimfFinanceimfMonetary economicsimfPrice stabilizationimfFinancial sector stabilityimfCreditimfPricesimfBanks and bankingimfGovernment policyimfFinancial services industryimfOption pricingimfBanks and banking, Central.Banks and banking.Banks and BankingFinance: GeneralInflationMacroeconomicsMoney and Monetary PolicyOptimization TechniquesProgramming ModelsDynamic AnalysisMacroeconomics: ConsumptionSavingWealthContingent PricingFutures Pricingoption pricingPrice LevelDeflationBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralBankingFinanceMonetary economicsPrice stabilizationFinancial sector stabilityCreditPricesBanks and bankingGovernment policyFinancial services industryOption pricing332.1/52Valencia Fabian1815695Ueda Kenichi1815625International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910968229503321Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation4371165UNINA