05636oam 22012854 450 991096732330332120250426110446.0978661383010497814623891551462389155978145270473914527047329781283517652128351765597814519831281451983123(CKB)3360000000443936(EBL)3014450(SSID)ssj0000941469(PQKBManifestationID)11492041(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941469(PQKBWorkID)10963976(PQKB)10469088(OCoLC)694141111(MiAaPQ)EBC3014450(IMF)WPIEE2006156(IMF)WPIEA2006156WPIEA2006156(EXLCZ)99336000000044393620020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrIMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention : An Analytical Framework /Jun Kim1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (39 p.)IMF Working Papers"June 2006."9781451864168 1451864167 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE MODEL""; ""III. MODEL SOLUTION""; ""IV. COMPARATIVE STATICS""; ""V. KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""This paper presents an analytical framework for considering the role of IMF-supported programs in preventing crises, particularly capital account crises. The model builds upon the global games framework to establish a unique relationship between the crisis probability and the parameters of the program, which is assumed to be negotiated between the IMF and the member country, taking explicit account of each party's interests. In the model, from the perspective of the borrowing country, IMF financing and policy adjustment are (perfect) substitutes inasmuch as they both contribute to the country's liquidity and thus reduce the likelihood of a crisis. In equilibrium, however, IMF financing promotes stronger policies, implying that financing and adjustment are strong complements in crisis prevention. Conditionality plays a crucial role in sustaining the program, providing mutual assurances-to the member country that, if it undertakes the agreed policies, financing will indeed be forthcoming, and to the IMF that the country will implement the agreed policies as the IMF disburses its resources. The model helps explain how liquidity crises may come about, how IMF support can reduce the likelihood of a crisis by providing liquidity and sustaining stronger policies, and why the observed mix between financing and adjustment may vary across programs.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/156Economic assistanceEconometric modelsEconomic policyEconometric modelsFinancial crisesPreventionEconometric modelsBalance of paymentsimfBankruptcyimfCapital movementsimfCapital outflowsimfCrisis managementimfCrisis preventionimfCurrent Account AdjustmentimfCurrent account balanceimfDebtimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfEconomicsimfExports and ImportsimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfInternational economicsimfInternational InvestmentimfInvestment DecisionsimfLiquidationimfLiquidityimfLong-term Capital MovementsimfPortfolio ChoiceimfShort-term Capital MovementsimfSolvencyimfEconomic assistanceEconometric models.Economic policyEconometric models.Financial crisesPreventionEconometric models.Balance of paymentsBankruptcyCapital movementsCapital outflowsCrisis managementCrisis preventionCurrent Account AdjustmentCurrent account balanceDebtEconomic & financial crises & disastersEconomicsExports and ImportsFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial Risk ManagementInternational economicsInternational InvestmentInvestment DecisionsLiquidationLiquidityLong-term Capital MovementsPortfolio ChoiceShort-term Capital MovementsSolvencyKim Jun1647813International Monetary Fund.Policy Development and Review Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910967323303321IMF-Supported Programs and Crisis Prevention4371400UNINA