05772oam 22014774 450 991096712290332120250426110717.09786613830586978146235788814623578819781452773360145277336X9781283518130128351813997814519083811451908385(CKB)3360000000443982(EBL)3014377(SSID)ssj0000940068(PQKBManifestationID)11502267(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940068(PQKBWorkID)10947100(PQKB)11529341(OCoLC)698585618(IMF)WPIEE2006042(MiAaPQ)EBC3014377(IMF)WPIEA2006042WPIEA2006042(EXLCZ)99336000000044398220020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrBanks During the Argentine Crisis : Were they All Hurt Equally? Did they All Behave Equally? /V. Juan-Ramon, Emiliano Basco, Carlos Quarracino, Adolfo Barajas1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (42 p.)IMF Working Papers"February 2006."9781451863024 1451863020 ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGENTINE BANKS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE CRISIS""; ""III. DESCRIPTIVE LOOK AT ARGENTINE BANKS IN THE 1995â€?2001 PERIOD""; ""IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""The simple answer to both questions in the title of this paper is: No. We concentrate on the three main risk elements that contributed to the banking system’s difficulties during the crisis: increasing dollarization of the balance sheet, expanding exposure to the government, and, eventually, the run on deposits. We find that there was substantial cross-bank variation in these elements—that is, not all banks were hurt equally by macroeconomic shocks. Furthermore, using panel data estimation for the 1998–2001 period, we find that depositors were able to distinguish high- from low-risk banks, and that individual banks’ exposure to currency and government default risk depended on bank fundamentals and other characteristics. Thus, not all banks behaved equally in the run-up to the crisis. Finally, our results have implications for the existence of market discipline in periods of stress and for banking regulation, which may have led banks to underestimate some of the risks they incurred.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/042Banks and bankingArgentinaBank failuresArgentinaFinancial crisesArgentinaBank depositsimfBankingimfBanks and BankingimfBanks and bankingimfBanksimfCommercial banksimfCurrenciesimfDebts, ExternalimfDepository InstitutionsimfEvent StudiesimfExports and ImportsimfExternal debtimfFinancial institutionsimfFinancial servicesimfForeign currency exposureimfForeign exchange marketimfGovernment and the Monetary SystemimfInformation and Market EfficiencyimfInternational economicsimfInternational Finance: GeneralimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMonetary economicsimfMonetary SystemsimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfMoneyimfMortgagesimfOpen Economy MacroeconomicsimfPayment SystemsimfRegimesimfStandardsimfArgentinaimfBanks and bankingBank failuresFinancial crisesBank depositsBankingBanks and BankingBanks and bankingBanksCommercial banksCurrenciesDebts, ExternalDepository InstitutionsEvent StudiesExports and ImportsExternal debtFinancial institutionsFinancial servicesForeign currency exposureForeign exchange marketGovernment and the Monetary SystemInformation and Market EfficiencyInternational economicsInternational Finance: GeneralInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsMicro Finance InstitutionsMonetary economicsMonetary SystemsMoney and Monetary PolicyMoneyMortgagesOpen Economy MacroeconomicsPayment SystemsRegimesStandardsJuan-Ramon V1816050Barajas Adolfo1816051Basco Emiliano1816052Quarracino Carlos1816053International Monetary Fund.IMF Institute.DcWaIMFBOOK9910967122903321Banks During the Argentine Crisis4371688UNINA