02706nam 2200613 a 450 991096624010332120240514033713.097815890180061589018001(CKB)2550000000053764(EBL)773221(OCoLC)754582268(SSID)ssj0000540877(PQKBManifestationID)11367177(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000540877(PQKBWorkID)10492075(PQKB)11470084(MiAaPQ)EBC773221(MdBmJHUP)muse893(Au-PeEL)EBL773221(CaPaEBR)ebr10500355(Perlego)949403(EXLCZ)99255000000005376420110203d2011 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrA revolution in military adaptation the US Army in the Iraq War /Chad C. Serena1st ed.Washington, D.C. Georgetown University Press20111 online resource (453 p.)Description based upon print version of record.9781589017832 1589017838 Includes bibliographical references and index.Decisions in the post-Cold War period -- The transformation of the U.S. Army -- The invasion of Iraq and compelled adaptation -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational inputs -- U.S. Army adaptation organizational outputs and learning -- The U.S. Army and the post-9/11 international security environment in perspective.During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control. To achieve success, the US AStrategic cultureUnited StatesOrganizational changeOrganizational effectivenessStrategic cultureOrganizational change.Organizational effectiveness.956.7044/340973Serena Chad C1636867MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910966240103321A revolution in military adaptation4365719UNINA