01267nam0 2200337 450 00002183020090224152228.020080626d1919----km-y0itaa50------baitaITRubâiyâtdi Omar Khayyâmsecondo la lezione di Edoardo FitzgeraldTraduzione di Mario ChiniLanciano<<G.>> Carabba editorestampa 1919XXXVIII, 127 p.16 cmScrittori italiani e stranieriSul front. firma autografa: Sergio de Pilato, '9202001Scrittori italiani e stranieri891.51(21 ed.)Letteratura persiana anticaKhayyām,Omar Ibrhaim0FitzGerald,Edward<1809-1883>Chini,MarioITUniversità della Basilicata - B.I.A.RICAunimarc000021830Rub�iy�88543UNIBASLETTERESTD0620120080626BAS011626TTM3020090223BAS011012TTM3020090224BAS011521TTM3020090224BAS011522BAS01BAS01BOOKBASA1Polo Storico-UmanisticoFDEP2Fondo De Pilato BiscioneFD/107738107730L1077382009022452Rari01062nam0 22002531i 450 UON0000973920231205101928.13590-900551-7-720020107d1992 |0itac50 baengNL|||| 1||||INTERNATIONAL Manual of Planning Practice Second Edition 1992International Society of City and Regional PlannersThe HagueIsocarp1992. 313 p. ; 21 cmNLDen HaagUONL000378GEO XGEOGRAFIA POLITICA E REGIONALEAInternational Society of City and Regional PlannersThe HagueUONV008265IsocarpUONV247123650ITSOL20240220RICASIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEOUONSIUON00009739SIBA - SISTEMA BIBLIOTECARIO DI ATENEOSI geo DIP.SC.SOC. 243 SI SA 75468 5 243 INTERNATIONAL Manual of Planning Practice Second Edition 19921178190UNIOR05842oam 22010454 450 991096559840332120250426110652.0978661284253597814623113851462311385978145278741114527874179781451871784145187178397812828425331282842536(CKB)3170000000055203(EBL)1608176(SSID)ssj0000941480(PQKBManifestationID)11473995(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941480(PQKBWorkID)10963971(PQKB)11134282(OCoLC)680613619(IMF)WPIEE2009031(MiAaPQ)EBC1608176(IMF)WPIEA2009031WPIEA2009031(EXLCZ)99317000000005520320020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrIn Search of WTO Trade Effects : Preferential Trade Agreements Promote Trade Strongly, But Unevenly /Theo Eicher, Christian Henn1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (32 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781451916140 1451916140 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Data; III. Extending the Empirical Framework to Account for Individual PTA Effects; A. Results: WTO Trade Impact After Controlling for Multilateral Resistance and Individual PTA Effects (Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive WTO Coding); B. Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive Coding and SW's "Implicit Industrialized PTA Dummy"; IV. Individual PTA Effects, Multilateral Resistance, and Unobserved Bilateral HeterogeneityA. WTO Trade Impact: Controlling for Multilateral Resistance, Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and Individual PTA Effects (Hierarchical/Mutually Exclusive WTO Coding)V. Individual PTA Trade Effects, Multilateral Resistance, and Unobserved Bilateral Hetergeneity (Mutually Inclusive WTO Coding); A. WTO Trade Impact: Controlling for Multilateral Resistance, Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and Individual PTA Effects (Mutually Inclusive WTO Coding); VI. Individual PTA Trade Effects: Sensitivity to Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity and Multilateral Resistance Controls; VII. ConclusionReferencesTables; 1. WTO and PTA Effects (Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive Coding); 1.a. Raw Regression Output; 2. WTO and PTA Effects (Inclusive Coding); Appendices; A1. Membership in considered Preferential Trading Arrangements; A2. Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements considered in BilateralPTAmxt; A3. List of Countries in sample and year of WTO accession; B1. De jure coding. WTO and PTA Effects (Hierarchical, Mutually Exclusive Coding); B1.a. Raw Regression Output De jure Coding; B2. De jure coding. WTO and PTA Effects (Inclusive Coding)The literature measuring the impact of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) and WTO membership on trade flows has produced remarkably diverse results. Rose's (2004) seminal paper reports a range of specifications that show no WTO effects, but Subramanian and Wei (2007) contend that he does not fully control for multilateral resistance (which could bias WTO estimates). Subramanian and Wei (2007) address multilateral resistance comprehensively to report strong WTO trade effects for industrialized countries but do not account for unobserved bilateral heterogeneity (which could inflate WTO estimates). We unify these two approaches by accounting for both multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, while also allowing for individual trade effects of PTAs. WTO effects vanish and remain insignificant throughout once multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual PTA effects are introduced. The result is robust to the use of alternative definitions and coding conventions for WTO membership that have been employed by Rose (2004), Tomz et al. (2007), or by Subramanian and Wei's (2007).IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/031Terms of tradeTariff preferencesBalance of tradeimfCommercial treatiesimfEmpirical Studies of TradeimfExports and ImportsimfImportsimfInternational economicsimfInternational Trade OrganizationsimfInternational tradeimfNorth American Free Trade AgreementimfPlurilateral tradeimfTrade agreementsimfTrade balanceimfTrade PolicyimfTrade: GeneralimfLuxembourgimfTerms of trade.Tariff preferences.Balance of tradeCommercial treatiesEmpirical Studies of TradeExports and ImportsImportsInternational economicsInternational Trade OrganizationsInternational tradeNorth American Free Trade AgreementPlurilateral tradeTrade agreementsTrade balanceTrade PolicyTrade: General382.3;382.30973Eicher Theo1176252Henn Christian1815818DcWaIMFBOOK9910965598403321In Search of WTO Trade Effects4371348UNINA