05362oam 22012494 450 991096559530332120250426110546.0978661284340297814623466911462346693978145199231114519923199781451872736145187273997812828434001282843400(CKB)3170000000055282(SSID)ssj0000940829(PQKBManifestationID)11547859(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940829(PQKBWorkID)10955612(PQKB)11354708(OCoLC)586083080(MiAaPQ)EBC1605916(IMF)WPIEE2009126(IMF)WPIEA2009126WPIEA2009126(EXLCZ)99317000000005528220020129d2009 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrFiscal Policy Rules for Oil-Producing Countries : A Welfare-Based Assessment /Wojciech Maliszewski1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.27 pIMF Working PapersBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9781451917024 1451917023 Includes bibliographical references.Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Fiscal Rules for OPCs -- A. Optimizing Rules -- B. Ad hoc Rules -- III. Numerical Comparisons -- A. Setup and Assumptions -- B. Results -- IV. Conclusions -- Tables -- 1. Initial Conditions -- 2. Model Parameters -- 3. Comparison of Policy Rules (Baseline) -- 4. Comparison of Policy Rules (Alternative Specification for the Oil Price Process) -- Figures -- 1. PIM and POIM Rules for the Mature Oil Producer -- 2. PIM and POIM Rules for the Large Oil Producer -- 3. PIM and POIM Rules for the Medium Oil Producer -- 4. POIM and MPOIM Rules for the Mature Oil Producer -- 5. POIM and MPOIM Rules for the Large Oil Producer -- 6. POIM and MPOIM Rules for the Medium Oil Producer -- 7. MPOIM and ad hoc Rules for the Mature Oil Producer -- 8. MPOIM and ad hoc Rules for the Large Oil Producer -- 9. MPOIM and ad hoc Rules for the Medium Oil Producer -- References.The paper presents numerical simulations of various fiscal rules for oil-producing countries. Welfare implications are sensitive to the choice of the social welfare function, initial conditions, and non-oil growth prospects. The distribution of non-oil wealth is important for countries with relatively low oil reserves. Corrections for adjustment costs and uncertainty with respect to oil prices should be applied carefully. While avoiding sharp changes in the fiscal policy stance may be appealing, it is not necessarily optimal if the initial position is unsustainable. Ad hoc rules are shown to perform poorly. The analysis abstracts from several issues critical for developing a practical policy advice and should not be treated as a complete framework.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/126Petroleum industry and tradeEconomic aspectsFiscal policyAggregate Factor Income DistributionimfBusiness Taxes and SubsidiesimfCommoditiesimfConsumptionimfEconomicsimfEnergy: Demand and SupplyimfEnergy: GeneralimfFiscal PolicyimfGovernment consumptionimfIncomeimfInvestment & securitiesimfInvestments: EnergyimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfNational accountsimfOil pricesimfOilimfOil, gas and mining taxesimfPetroleum industry and tradeimfPricesimfPublic finance & taxationimfSavingimfTaxationimfTaxesimfWealthimfUnited StatesimfPetroleum industry and tradeEconomic aspects.Fiscal policy.Aggregate Factor Income DistributionBusiness Taxes and SubsidiesCommoditiesConsumptionEconomicsEnergy: Demand and SupplyEnergy: GeneralFiscal PolicyGovernment consumptionIncomeInvestment & securitiesInvestments: EnergyMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionNational accountsOil pricesOilOil, gas and mining taxesPetroleum industry and tradePricesPublic finance & taxationSavingTaxationTaxesWealthMaliszewski Wojciech1109477DcWaIMFBOOK9910965595303321Fiscal Policy Rules for Oil-Producing Countries4371347UNINA