05760oam 22013454 450 991096453300332120250426110115.0978661382596497814623477801462347789978145199338714519933829781283513517128351351X97814519094011451909403(CKB)3360000000443588(EBL)3014442(SSID)ssj0000939916(PQKBManifestationID)11502257(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939916(PQKBWorkID)10938658(PQKB)11541907(OCoLC)694141096(IMF)WPIEE2006227(MiAaPQ)EBC3014442(IMF)WPIEA2006227WPIEA2006227(EXLCZ)99336000000044358820020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy : Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence /Bernard Laurens, Marco Arnone, Jean-François Segalotto1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (85 p.)IMF Working Papers"October 2006."9781451864878 1451864876 Includes bibliographical references (p.79-85).""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION TO INDICATORS OF CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY""; ""II. BASE INDICATORS OF DE JURE AUTONOMY""; ""III. SUBSEQUENT LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BASE INDICATORS""; ""IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix I. Statistical Tables""; ""Appendix II. Summary of Base Indicators of De Jure Autonomy Robin Bade, Michael Parkin ( 1977).""; ""Appendix III. Summary of Base Indicators of De Facto Autonomy Alex Cukierman ( 1992).""; ""Appendix IV. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Jure Autonomy""; ""Appendix V. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Facto Autonomy""; ""REFERENCES""This paper presents a survey of the literature on the measurement of central bank autonomy. We distinguish inputs that constitute the building blocks in the literature, and the literature that builds on them. Issues including sensitivity analysis, robustness, and endogeneity are discussed. The review shows that empirical evidence regarding the beneficial effects of central bank autonomy is substantial, although some technical issues still remain for further research. In particular, central bank autonomy raises the issue of subjecting the monetary authorities to democratic control; this calls for additional research on the linkages between central bank autonomy and accountability and transparency. Additional empirical analysis on the relationship between the financial strength of the central bank and its de facto autonomy, and between its autonomy and financial stability, would also be desirable.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/227Banks and banking, CentralManagementEconometric modelsMonetary policyEconometric modelsCentral Banks and Their PoliciesimfDebt ManagementimfDebtimfDebts, PublicimfDeflationimfGovernment debt managementimfGovernment policyimfIncome economicsimfInflationimfLaborimfLabourimfLegal support in revenue administrationimfMacroeconomicsimfMonetary PolicyimfPrice LevelimfPrice stabilizationimfPricesimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfRevenue administrationimfRevenueimfSovereign DebtimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfWage bargainingimfWagesimfWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public PolicyimfUnited StatesimfBanks and banking, CentralManagementEconometric models.Monetary policyEconometric models.Central Banks and Their PoliciesDebt ManagementDebtDebts, PublicDeflationGovernment debt managementGovernment policyIncome economicsInflationLaborLabourLegal support in revenue administrationMacroeconomicsMonetary PolicyPrice LevelPrice stabilizationPricesPublic finance & taxationPublic FinancePublic financial management (PFM)Revenue administrationRevenueSovereign DebtTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralWage bargainingWagesWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public PolicyLaurens Bernard1815658Arnone Marco120033Segalotto Jean-François1815657International Monetary Fund.Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910964533003321The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy4372568UNINA