01164cam0-22003731i-450 99000468659040332120180215111524.0FED01000468659(Aleph)000468659FED0100046865919990604d1965----km-y0itay50------baitaITy-------001yyStudi CatullianiArmando SalvatoreNapoliLibreria Scientifica[1965]316 p.22 cmCollana di studi latini9Catullo, Gaio ValerioStudi874.0122itaSalvatore,Armando<1922- >158131ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990004686590403321P2B-650-CATULL.-8S.A.-L.S.1965Ist.Fil.Cl.4755FLFBCP2B-650-CATULL.-8S.A.-L.S.1965 BISIst.Fil.Cl.297FLFBCP2B-650-CATULL.-8S.A.-L.S.1965 TERIst.Fil.Cl.4755FLFBCP2B-650-CATULL.-8S.A.-L.S.1965 QUATERBibl. 39.072NAP03BIB. BAT.1382BATFLFBCNAP03BATStudi catulliani534230UNINA02720nam 22006854a 450 991096451830332120251116221009.00-19-988488-90-19-518772-51-4356-1847-597866111626411-281-16264-70-19-804061-X(CKB)2560000000058902(EBL)665416(OCoLC)704420600(SSID)ssj0000471468(PQKBManifestationID)12164508(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000471468(PQKBWorkID)10427776(PQKB)11527538(MiAaPQ)EBC665416(StDuBDS)EDZ0000075405(Au-PeEL)EBL665416(CaPaEBR)ebr10283563(CaONFJC)MIL116264(MiAaPQ)EBC7033306(Au-PeEL)EBL7033306(OCoLC)57730984(FINmELB)ELB164288(OCoLC)191826912(EXLCZ)99256000000005890220050208d2006 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrMoral skepticisms /Walter Sinnott-ArmstrongOxford ;New York Oxford University Press20061 online resource (286 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-19-978612-7 0-19-534206-2 Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-262) and index.Contents; PART I: ISSUES; Chapter 1. What Is Moral Epistemology?; Chapter 2. Are Moral Beliefs Truth-Apt?; Chapter 3. Are Any Moral Beliefs True?; Chapter 4. Are Any Moral Beliefs Justified?; Chapter 5. In Contrast with What?; Chapter 6. Classy Moral Pyrrhonism; PART II: THEORIES; Chapter 7. Naturalism; Chapter 8. Normativism; Chapter 9. Intuitionism; Chapter 10. Coherentism; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; ZSinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive survey of the difficult subject of moral beliefs. He covers theories that grapple with questions of morality such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism. He then defends his own theory that he calls ""moderate moral skepticism,"" which is that moral beliefs can be justified, but not extremely justified.EthicsSkepticismEthics.Skepticism.171/.2Sinnott-Armstrong Walter1955-164084MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910964518303321Moral skepticisms4465078UNINA