00847cam0 2200241 450 E60020004501720200525092751.020090209d1969 |||||ita|0103 baengUSRomanticism in perspectiveA comparative study of aspects of the Romantic movements in England, France and GermanyLilian R. FurstNew YorkMacmillan1969366 p.22 cmFurst, Lilian R.A600200052566070131726ITUNISOB20200525RICAUNISOBUNISOB10010391E600200045017M 102 Monografia moderna SBNM100000740Si10391acquistopregresso2UNISOBUNISOB20090209113122.020200525092736.0SpinosaRomanticism in Perspective698753UNISOB03860nam 22006971c 450 991096398180332120200115203623.097812813572291281357227978147256015514725601599781847313928184731392210.5040/9781472560155(CKB)1000000000408607(EBL)343081(OCoLC)476157507(MiAaPQ)EBC1772850(MiAaPQ)EBC343081(Au-PeEL)EBL1772850(CaPaEBR)ebr10913747(CaONFJC)MIL135722(OCoLC)232956829(UtOrBLW)bpp09256140(Au-PeEL)EBL343081(UtOrBLW)BP9781472560155BC(EXLCZ)99100000000040860720140929d2007 uy 0engur|n|---|||||rdacontentrdamediardacarrierAnswering for crime responsibility and liability in the criminal law R. A. Duff1st ed.Oxford Portland, Oregon Hart Publishing 2007.1 online resource (342 p.)Legal theory todayDescription based upon print version of record.9781849460330 1849460337 9781841137537 1841137537 Includes bibliographical references (pages 299-316) and indexINTRODUCTION -- 1. RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY -- 2. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE AS WHAT, TO WHOM? -- 3. RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? -- 4. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? (1) CRIMES AS WRONGS -- 5. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? (2) ACTION AND CRIME -- 6. CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT? (3) HARMS, WRONGS AND CRIMES -- 7. STRUCTURES OF CRIME: ATTACKS AND NDANGERMENTS -- 8. ANSWERING AND REFUSING TO ANSWER -- 9. OFFENCES, DEFENCES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE -- 10. STRICT LIABILITY AND STRICT RESPONSIBILITY -- 11. UNDERSTANDING DEFENCESIn this long-awaited book, Antony Duff offers a new perspective on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalisation, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences. The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to accountLegal theory today.Criminal lawPhilosophyCriminal law & procedureCriminal liabilityCriminal lawPhilosophy.Criminal liability.345.0401Duff Antony1788345UtOrBLWUtOrBLWUkLoBPBOOK9910963981803321Answering for crime4339913UNINA