03786oam 2200685 a 450 991096251910332120200520144314.097984006911579780313012020031301202410.5040/9798400691157(CKB)111087026964014(OCoLC)70750345(CaPaEBR)ebrary10023103(SSID)ssj0000210592(PQKBManifestationID)11180271(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000210592(PQKBWorkID)10292157(PQKB)10626475(Au-PeEL)EBL3000796(CaPaEBR)ebr10023103(OCoLC)929145050(MiAaPQ)EBC3000796(OCoLC)1176048553(DLC)BP9798400691157BC(Perlego)4202570(EXLCZ)9911108702696401420011114e20022024 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrA new nuclear century strategic stability and arms control /Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras1st ed.Westport, Conn. :Praeger,2002.London :Bloomsbury Publishing,20241 online resource (205 p.)Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9780275970611 0275970612 Includes bibliographical references and index.Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgments --Introduction --1 First-Strike Stability Modeling: The Crazy Mathematics of -- the Cold War --2 Redefining Strategic Stability --3 Friction and Nuclear Deterrence --4 Triad and Tribulation: U.S. and Russian START Options --5 Proliferation in an Unstable World --Conclusion --Further Reading --Index.Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved. They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia-one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear arms controlWorld politics1989-Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear arms control.World politics327.1/747Cimbala Stephen J846069Scouras James1798481DLCDLCDLCBOOK9910962519103321A new nuclear century4341283UNINA