06190oam 22013814 450 991096213110332120250426110139.0978661284459197814623113611462311369978145278335214527833579781451874174145187417097812828445991282844598(CKB)3170000000055401(EBL)1606008(SSID)ssj0001488803(PQKBManifestationID)11842765(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488803(PQKBWorkID)11445561(PQKB)11063769(OCoLC)671571362(IMF)WPIEE2009272(MiAaPQ)EBC1606008(IMF)WPIEA2009272WPIEA2009272(EXLCZ)99317000000005540120020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrWho Disciplines Bank Managers? /Andrea Maechler, Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak, Stéphanie Marie Stolz1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (76 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781451918335 145191833X Includes bibliographical references.Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group)6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group; VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; FootnotesWe bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/272Banks and bankingCorporate governanceBank soundnessimfBankingimfBanks and BankingimfBanks and bankingimfBanksimfCorporate Finance and Governance: GeneralimfCorporate FinanceimfCorporate financeimfCorporations--FinanceimfCrisis managementimfDeposit insuranceimfDepository InstitutionsimfDiscrete Regression and Qualitative Choice ModelsimfDiscrete RegressorsimfEconometric modelsimfEconometrics & economic statisticsimfEconometricsimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfLogit modelsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfProportionsimfUnited StatesimfBanks and banking.Corporate governance.Bank soundnessBankingBanks and BankingBanks and bankingBanksCorporate Finance and Governance: GeneralCorporate FinanceCorporate financeCorporations--FinanceCrisis managementDeposit insuranceDepository InstitutionsDiscrete Regression and Qualitative Choice ModelsDiscrete RegressorsEconometric modelsEconometrics & economic statisticsEconometricsEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial Risk ManagementGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationLogit modelsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesProportions338.23178Maechler Andrea1815593Cihak Martin1106217Schaeck Klaus1816436Stolz Stéphanie Marie1815676International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910962131103321Who Disciplines Bank Managers4372844UNINA