05778oam 22013454 450 991096180730332120250426110038.0978661284308297814623477041462347703978145272585714527258539781282843080128284308797814518723541451872356(CKB)3170000000055235(EBL)1608236(SSID)ssj0000940086(PQKBManifestationID)11576138(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940086(PQKBWorkID)10946363(PQKB)10711506(OCoLC)466422400(IMF)WPIEE2009088(MiAaPQ)EBC1608236(IMF)WPIEA2009088WPIEA2009088(EXLCZ)99317000000005523520020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrChile’s Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule : A Model-Based Evaluation /Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (56 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781451916706 1451916701 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; Figures; 1. Goods and Factor Flows in GIMF; A. Overlapping Generations Households; B. Liquidity Constrained Households; C. Manufacturers; D. Copper Producers; E. Unions; F. Import Agents; G. Distributors; H. Retailers; I. Government; J. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; III. Calibration; IV. Choice of Countercyclical Coefficients; Tables; 1. Fiscal Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Volatility; 2. Policy Efficiency Frontiers; V. Choice of Surplus Target; 3. SFS Rule - Survey; 4. SFS Rule - Fiscal Accounts; 5. Balanced Budget Rule - Survey6. Balanced Budget Rule - Fiscal Accounts7. Aggressive Countercyclical Rule - Survey; 8. Aggressive Countercyclical Rule - Fiscal Accounts; 9. Surplus Target Shock - Survey; 10. Surplus Target Shock - Fiscal; VI. Summary; References; Appendices; 1. Population Growth; 2. Optimality Conditions for OLG Households; 3. Consumption and Wealth; 4. Optimality for Manufacturing FirmsThe paper analyzes Chile's structural balance fiscal rule in the face of copper price shocks originating in foreign copper demand. It uses a version of the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) that includes a copper sector. Two results are obtained. First, Chile's current fiscal rule performs well if the policymaker puts a small weight on output volatility (relative to inflation volatility) in his/her objective function. A more aggressive countercyclical fiscal rule can attain lower output volatility, but there is a trade-off with (somewhat) higher inflation volatility and (much) higher volatility of fiscal variables. Second, given its current stock of government assets, Chile's adoption of a 0.5% surplus target starting in 2008 is desirable from a business cycle perspective. This is because the earlier 1% target would have required significant further asset accumulation that could only have been accomplished at the expense of greater volatility in fiscal instruments and therefore in GDP.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/088Fiscal policyChileFinance, PublicChileCementimfCeramicsimfConsumptionimfCopperimfDeflationimfEconomicsimfGlassimfIncome economicsimfInflationimfInvestment & securitiesimfInvestments: MetalsimfLabor economicsimfLabor Economics: GeneralimfLaborimfLabourimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfMetals and Metal ProductsimfPrice LevelimfPricesimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfRevenue administrationimfRevenueimfSavingimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfWealthimfChileimfFiscal policyFinance, PublicCementCeramicsConsumptionCopperDeflationEconomicsGlassIncome economicsInflationInvestment & securitiesInvestments: MetalsLabor economicsLabor Economics: GeneralLaborLabourMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionMetals and Metal ProductsPrice LevelPricesPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceRevenue administrationRevenueSavingTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralWealth332.152Kumhof Michael1815645Laxton Douglas1594457DcWaIMFBOOK9910961807303321Chile’s Structural Fiscal Surplus Rule4371260UNINA