05772oam 22013214 450 991096180700332120250426110046.0978661284297997814623598131462359817978145278438014527843889781451872231145187223297812828429771282842978(CKB)3170000000055240(EBL)1608240(SSID)ssj0000943063(PQKBManifestationID)11503271(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943063(PQKBWorkID)10994196(PQKB)10205806(OCoLC)608248529(IMF)WPIEE2009076(MiAaPQ)EBC1608240(IMF)WPIEA2009076WPIEA2009076(EXLCZ)99317000000005524020020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSimple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules /Michael Kumhof, Douglas Laxton1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (43 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781451916584 1451916582 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Literature Survey; III. The Model; A. Households; 1. Infinitely Lived Households; 2. Liquidity Constrained Households; B. Manufacturing; C. Copper Production; D. Distribution; E. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Fiscal Policy; F. Fiscal Policy Rules; 1. Chile's Structural Surplus Rule; 2. A Tax Revenue Gap Targeting Rule; 3. A Tax Revenue Gap Instrument Rule; G. Shocks; H. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; I. Computation of Welfare; IV. Calibration; A. Steady State; B. Policy Rules, Adjustment Costs and Shocks; Tables; 1. Key Moments of the Data; V. ResultsA. Monetary RulesB. Impulse Responses; C. Welfare; D. Fiscal Instrument Volatility; E. Welfare - Fiscal Instrument Volatility Efficiency Frontiers; F. Macroeconomic Volatility; G. Other Real Activity Gaps?; H. Openness; I. Alternative Fiscal Instruments; VI. Conclusion; Figures; 1. IRF for Technology Shock; 2. IRF for Investment Shock; 3. IRF for Copper Demand Shock; 4. Welfare for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 5. Fiscal Instrument Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 6. Efficiency Frontiers; 7. Macroeconomic Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 8. Openness; 9. Welfare and Fiscal Instruments10. Fiscal Volatility for Different Fiscal InstrumentsAppendices; 1. Optimality Conditions of the Model; 2. Welfare Computations; ReferencesThis paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclical tax revenue gap rule increases welfare gains by around 50 percent, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility. For raw materials revenue gaps the government should let automatic stabilizers work. The best fiscal instruments are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes, or, if it enters private utility, government spending. The welfare gains are significantly lower for more open economies.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/076Fiscal policyEconomic policyCementimfCeramicsimfConsumptionimfCopperimfEconomicsimfFiscal PolicyimfFiscal policyimfGlassimfIncome economicsimfInvestment & securitiesimfInvestments: MetalsimfLabor economicsimfLabor Economics: GeneralimfLaborimfLabourimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfMetals and Metal ProductsimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfRevenue administrationimfRevenueimfSavingimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfWealthimfChileimfFiscal policy.Economic policy.CementCeramicsConsumptionCopperEconomicsFiscal PolicyFiscal policyGlassIncome economicsInvestment & securitiesInvestments: MetalsLabor economicsLabor Economics: GeneralLaborLabourMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionMetals and Metal ProductsPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceRevenue administrationRevenueSavingTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralWealth332.152Kumhof Michael1815645Laxton Douglas1594457International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910961807003321Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules4371773UNINA