05079oam 22013454 450 991096180280332120250426110935.0978661284402797814623174241462317421978128284402512828440249781452721811145272181597814518734051451873409(CKB)3170000000055339(SSID)ssj0000941491(PQKBManifestationID)11577297(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941491(PQKBWorkID)10982268(PQKB)10134096(OCoLC)649466035(MiAaPQ)EBC1608810(IMF)WPIEE2009193(IMF)WPIEA2009193WPIEA2009193(EXLCZ)99317000000005533920020129d2009 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrInstitutional Inertia /Laura Valderrama1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.25 pIMF Working PapersBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph9781451917642 1451917643 Includes bibliographical references.Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. A Tale of Explorers, Gold, and Diamonds -- III. The Model -- A. The Cooperative -- 1. Redistribution (date 2 vote) -- 2. Technology choice (date 1 vote) -- 3. Example: Voting for an inefficient polarized technology -- B. Outside Ownership -- C. Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership -- IV. Institutional Inertia -- V. Discussion -- A. Supporting Evidence -- B. Implications for Institutional Design -- VI. Concluding Remarks -- References -- Footnotes.We study the relative efficiency of outside-owned versus employee-owned firms and analyze implications for institutional change in a context of technological innovation. When decisions are made through majority voting, the vote on technology choice is used to influence the later vote on the sharing rule. We show how this dynamic voting generates a systematic technological bias that is contingent on firm ownership. We provide conditions under which the pivotal voter's political leverage leads the firm to an institutional trap whereby majority voting and inefficient technology choice reinforce each other, leading to institutional inertia.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/193Technological innovationsIndustrial managementCementimfCeramicsimfGeneral issuesimfGlassimfGoldimfHuman CapitalimfHuman capitalimfIncome economicsimfIndustrial productivityimfInnovationimfIntellectual Property Rights: GeneralimfInvestment & securitiesimfInvestments: MetalsimfLabor ProductivityimfLaborimfLabourimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ProductionimfMetals and Metal ProductsimfOccupational ChoiceimfProduction and Operations ManagementimfProductivityimfResearch and DevelopmentimfSkillsimfTechnological ChangeimfTechnologyimfWagesimfWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralimfUnited StatesimfTechnological innovations.Industrial management.CementCeramicsGeneral issuesGlassGoldHuman CapitalHuman capitalIncome economicsIndustrial productivityInnovationIntellectual Property Rights: GeneralInvestment & securitiesInvestments: MetalsLabor ProductivityLaborLabourMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ProductionMetals and Metal ProductsOccupational ChoiceProduction and Operations ManagementProductivityResearch and DevelopmentSkillsTechnological ChangeTechnologyWagesWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General658.4;658.4063Valderrama Laura1815686International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910961802803321Institutional Inertia4372510UNINA