05957oam 22013814 450 991096089200332120250426110651.097866128425119781462362844146236284297814527036641452703663978145187176014518717679781282842519128284251X(CKB)3170000000055200(EBL)1608170(SSID)ssj0000943299(PQKBManifestationID)11524017(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943299(PQKBWorkID)10994227(PQKB)10731293(OCoLC)694140992(MiAaPQ)EBC1608170(IMF)WPIEE2009029(IMF)WPIEA2009029WPIEA2009029(EXLCZ)99317000000005520020020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies : How Much is theprivate Sector Affected? /Christoph Trebesch1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (37 p.)IMF Working Papers"February 2009."9781451916126 1451916124 Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature; A. Debt Crises and Private Sector Access to Credit; B. The Role of Cooperation and Policy Signals; III. Econometric Methodology; A. Previous Approaches; B. Estimated Model; C. Dependent Variable: Foreign Credit to the Private Sector; D. Measuring Crisis Episodes; IV. Data: The Index of Coerciveness; A. Composition of the Index; B. Coding of the Index; V. Estimation Issues: Controlling for Shocks, Politics and Fundamentals; VI. Discussion of Results; A. Main Results; B. Effects of Individual Coercive Policies; C. Robustness AnalysisVII. Concluding RemarksTables; 1. Emerging Market Countries Included in the Estimations; 2. List of Control Variables; 3. Effect of Aggressive Debt Policies on Total Amount Borrowed; 4. Default Effects and Aggressive Debt Policies During Default; 5. Effect of Individual Coercive Actions (9 Sub-Indicators); 6. Robustness Tests; ReferencesThis paper proposes a new empirical measure of cooperative versus conflictual crisis resolution following sovereign default and debt distress. The index of government coerciveness is presented as a proxy for excusable versus inexcusable default behaviour and used to evaluate the costs of default for the domestic private sector, in particular its access to international debt markets. Our findings indicate that unilateral, aggressive sovereign debt policies lead to a strong decline in corporate access to external finance (loans and bond issuance). We conclude that coercive government actions towards external creditors can have strong signalling effects with negative spillovers on domestic firms. "Good faith" debt renegotiations may be crucial to minimize the domestic costs of sovereign defaults.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/029Debts, PublicFiscal policyCapital and Ownership StructureimfCreditimfDebt defaultimfDebt ManagementimfDebt restructuringimfDebtimfDebts, ExternalimfDebts, PublicimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfExports and ImportsimfExternal debtimfFinanceimfFinancial CrisesimfFinancial crisesimfFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfFinancing PolicyimfGoodwillimfInternational economicsimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfMonetary economicsimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfMoneyimfPublic debtimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfSovereign DebtimfValue of FirmsimfUnited StatesimfDebts, Public.Fiscal policy.Capital and Ownership StructureCreditDebt defaultDebt ManagementDebt restructuringDebtDebts, ExternalDebts, PublicEconomic & financial crises & disastersExports and ImportsExternal debtFinanceFinancial CrisesFinancial crisesFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementFinancial Risk ManagementFinancing PolicyGoodwillInternational economicsInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsMonetary economicsMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyMoneyPublic debtPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceSovereign DebtValue of Firms332Trebesch Christoph873361International Monetary Fund.Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910960892003321The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies4372540UNINA