05444oam 22012254 450 991096008290332120250426110035.09786612843037978146233559614623355949781452758145145275814X9781451872309145187230597812828430351282843036(CKB)3170000000055216(EBL)1608208(SSID)ssj0001476990(PQKBManifestationID)11914269(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001476990(PQKBWorkID)11449384(PQKB)10384385(OCoLC)503190350(MiAaPQ)EBC1608208(IMF)WPIEE2009083(IMF)WPIEA2009083WPIEA2009083(EXLCZ)99317000000005521620020129d2009 uf 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrHold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? /Marco Pani1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (34 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781451916652 1451916655 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; ReferencesThis paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, some citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift in policy preferences in favor of higher public expenditure, they may support institutional arrangements that favor corruption (such as a weak enforcement of the law) in order to alter future policy decisions in their favor. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in a democracyto some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/083Political corruptionDemocracyAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsimfBudget planning and preparationimfBudget SystemsimfBudgetimfBudgeting & financial managementimfBudgetingimfBureaucracyimfCorporate crimeimfCorruptionimfCriminologyimfEconomicsimfExpenditureimfExpenditures, PublicimfNational BudgetimfNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralimfPolitical EconomyimfPolitical economyimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfTax incentivesimfTaxationimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfWhite-collar crimeimfItalyimfPolitical corruption.Democracy.Administrative Processes in Public OrganizationsBudget planning and preparationBudget SystemsBudgetBudgeting & financial managementBudgetingBureaucracyCorporate crimeCorruptionCriminologyEconomicsExpenditureExpenditures, PublicNational BudgetNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralPolitical EconomyPolitical economyPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceTax incentivesTaxationTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralWhite-collar crime332.152Pani Marco1816063DcWaIMFBOOK9910960082903321Hold Your Nose and Vote4371707UNINA