06038oam 22013814 450 991095739500332120250426110835.0978147552021714755202129781475539240147553924X(CKB)2670000000278823(EBL)1606936(SSID)ssj0000949374(PQKBManifestationID)11521999(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000949374(PQKBWorkID)10996015(PQKB)10526840(Au-PeEL)EBL1606936(CaPaEBR)ebr10627044(OCoLC)805985260(IMF)WPIEE2012204(IMF)WPIEA2012204(MiAaPQ)EBC1606936WPIEA2012204(EXLCZ)99267000000027882320020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrDonor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation /Kurt Annen, Luc Moers1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (38 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781475559576 1475559577 9781475505542 147550554X Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil IndexThis paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/204Economic assistanceFlow of fundsAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: GeneralimfBudget planning and preparationimfBudget SystemsimfBudgetimfBudgeting & financial managementimfBudgetingimfCompetitionimfExports and ImportsimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial marketsimfForeign AidimfForeign aidimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfGovernment PolicyimfInternational economicsimfInternational Fiscal IssuesimfInternational Public GoodsimfInternational reliefimfNational BudgetimfPoverty & precarityimfPoverty and HomelessnessimfPoverty reductionimfPovertyimfProvision and Effects of Welfare ProgramimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfSocial Services and WelfareimfSocial welfare & social servicesimfWelfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: GeneralimfChina, People's Republic ofimfEconomic assistance.Flow of funds.Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: GeneralBudget planning and preparationBudget SystemsBudgetBudgeting & financial managementBudgetingCompetitionExports and ImportsFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial marketsForeign AidForeign aidGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)Government PolicyInternational economicsInternational Fiscal IssuesInternational Public GoodsInternational reliefNational BudgetPoverty & precarityPoverty and HomelessnessPoverty reductionPovertyProvision and Effects of Welfare ProgramPublic financial management (PFM)Social Services and WelfareSocial welfare & social servicesWelfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: General337Annen Kurt1816244Moers Luc1816245DcWaIMFBOOK9910957395003321Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation4372059UNINA