05293oam 22012614 450 991095678800332120250426110742.0978661377591797814623894521462389457978145275636314527563689781281092861128109286X9781451890808145189080X(CKB)3360000000440961(EBL)3012568(SSID)ssj0000948674(PQKBManifestationID)11541741(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000948674(PQKBWorkID)10951877(PQKB)11180943(OCoLC)535146986(MiAaPQ)EBC3012568(IMF)WPIEE0092004(IMF)WPIEA0092004WPIEA0092004(EXLCZ)99336000000044096120020129d2004 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrTiming of International Bailouts /Se-Jik Kim1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2004.1 online resource (42 p.)IMF Working PapersCover title."January 2004"--Caption.9781451842623 1451842627 Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-41).""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CRISIS-PREVENTION FACILITY""; ""III. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""IV. LAISSEZ-FAIRE""; ""V. EXISTING CRISIS-LENDING FACILITIES""; ""VI. TIMING-BASED CRISIS-LENDING FACILITY""; ""VII. EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS""; ""VIII. CONCLUSION""; ""APPENDIX I""; ""APPENDIX II""; ""REFERENCES""This paper proposes that international rescue financing should not be provided to a country where a crisis first occurs, but rather to any country that suffers a subsequent crisis. Such a timing-based lending facility can be Pareto-superior to both laissez-faire and existing international crisis lending facilities, when domestic governments have more information on their own economies than does the international lender of last resort. The new facility mitigates moral hazard owing to information asymmetry by not rescuing the first-hit country. At the same time, it limits crisis contagion by rescuing countries in subsequent crises. Even in the presence of common shocks, the timing-based facility can reduce global risks of crisis because it induces countries to undertake greater crisis-prevention efforts so as not to become the first country hit.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2004/009Economic assistanceFinancial crisesMoral hazardBanks and banking, CentralimfCrisis managementimfCrisis preventionimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial CrisesimfFinancial crisesimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfFinancial risk managementimfFinancial sector policy and analysisimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfIndustrial productivityimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfInternational Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsimfLender of last resortimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ProductionimfMoral hazardimfProduction and Operations ManagementimfProductionimfProductivityimfArgentinaimfEconomic assistance.Financial crises.Moral hazard.Banks and banking, CentralCrisis managementCrisis preventionEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial CrisesFinancial crisesFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial Risk ManagementFinancial risk managementFinancial sector policy and analysisGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationIndustrial productivityInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsInternational Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsLender of last resortMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ProductionMoral hazardProduction and Operations ManagementProductionProductivityKim Se-Jik1623190International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910956788003321Timing of International Bailouts4372479UNINA