03011nam 2200685 a 450 991095649030332120230725061530.03-86838-062-03-11-032955-710.1515/9783110329551(CKB)2550000001097025(EBL)1215626(OCoLC)851972170(SSID)ssj0000801367(PQKBManifestationID)11430532(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000801367(PQKBWorkID)10793339(PQKB)11319747(DE-B1597)211948(OCoLC)1013963526(OCoLC)853257712(DE-B1597)9783110329551(Au-PeEL)EBL1215626(CaPaEBR)ebr10728680(CaONFJC)MIL503559(Perlego)653781(MiAaPQ)EBC1215626(EXLCZ)99255000000109702520130717d2010 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrIs truth the primary epistemic goal? /Markus Patrick HessFrankfurt Ontos Verlag20101 online resource (169 p.)Epistemische Studien : Schriften zue Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ;Bd. 17Description based upon print version of record.3-11-032938-7 1-299-72308-X Includes bibliographical references. Frontmatter -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments: -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal? -- 3. The Value of Truth -- 4. Requirements of the Truth Goal -- 5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal -- 6. Alternative Monism -- 7. The Value of Knowledge -- 8. Conclusion -- 9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism -- BibliographyThis book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only Epistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ;Bd. 17.TruthPhilosophyKnowledge, Theory ofGoal (Philosophy)TruthPhilosophy.Knowledge, Theory of.Goal (Philosophy)100Hess Markus Patrick1852413MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910956490303321Is truth the primary epistemic goal4447509UNINA