05701oam 22013574 450 991095615410332120250426110724.0978661284043297814623931381462393136978145274101714527410189781282840430128284043697814518694391451869436(CKB)3170000000054993(EBL)1607818(SSID)ssj0000943984(PQKBManifestationID)11518467(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943984(PQKBWorkID)10982472(PQKB)11537082(OCoLC)646904430(IMF)WPIEE2008082(MiAaPQ)EBC1607818(IMF)WPIEA2008082WPIEA2008082(EXLCZ)99317000000005499320020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrBreaking the Impediments to Budgetary Reforms : Evidence from Europe /Ashoka Mody, Stefania Fabrizio1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (33 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/82Description based upon print version of record.9781451913972 1451913974 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Data and Empirical Approach; III. The Setting: War of Attrition; IV. Economic Shocks and Crises; V. Credibility: Does It Take Nixon To Go To China?; VI. Conclusions; Appendices; I. Quality of Budget Institutions; Appendix Tables; 1. Construction of the Index: Fiscal Institutions and Their Index Parameters; 2. Index of Quality of Budget Institutions; 3. Fiscal Institutions' Quality Index; II. Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis; Tables; 1. War of Attrition; 2. Political Constraints; 3. Economic Shocks; 4. Crises and Reforms5. Credibility6. Model Predictions; Figures; 1. Average Value of Fiscal Institutions' Index, 1991-2004; 2. Quality of Fiscal Institutions' Index and Per Capita Income; 3. Fiscal Institutions' Index; 4. Interaction of Primary Balance and Fractionalization; 5. Nonlinear Effects in the Full Model; ReferencesUnder what conditions are budget institutions likely to be strengthened? We find that fiscal deficits do not help in focusing policymakers on undertaking reforms. To the contrary, the larger the deficit, the lower is the likelihood of reforms. Large deficits apparently imply strong claims on the budget and, hence, generate unwillingness to impose self-discipline. As such, countries will tend to move either to small fiscal deficits and good institutions or large deficits and weak institutions. Economic shocks (if they are large enough) can help build a constituency for improving budget institutions. However, if forgiving markets accommodate economic shocks, even such pressure may be insufficient. Forwardlooking and credible leadership appears to be an important ingredient of the solution.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/082Budget processEuropeBudget deficitsEuropeBalance of paymentsimfBudget planning and preparationimfBudget SystemsimfBudgetimfBudgeting & financial managementimfBudgetingimfCurrent Account AdjustmentimfCurrent account deficitsimfDebt ManagementimfDebtimfDebts, PublicimfDeflationimfExports and ImportsimfFiscal PolicyimfFiscal policyimfFiscal stanceimfGovernment debt managementimfInflationimfInternational economicsimfMacroeconomicsimfNational BudgetimfPrice LevelimfPricesimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfShort-term Capital MovementsimfSovereign DebtimfChina, People's Republic ofimfBudget processBudget deficitsBalance of paymentsBudget planning and preparationBudget SystemsBudgetBudgeting & financial managementBudgetingCurrent Account AdjustmentCurrent account deficitsDebt ManagementDebtDebts, PublicDeflationExports and ImportsFiscal PolicyFiscal policyFiscal stanceGovernment debt managementInflationInternational economicsMacroeconomicsNational BudgetPrice LevelPricesPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceShort-term Capital MovementsSovereign Debt352.48Mody Ashoka888386Fabrizio Stefania1103907DcWaIMFBOOK9910956154103321Breaking the Impediments to Budgetary Reforms4371279UNINA